Wildcat Capital Management Issues Letter to Consolidated Communications' Special Committee Urging it to Reject the Recent "Take Private" Proposal at $4.00 Per Share
Wildcat Capital Management Supports the Company's Strategy as a Standalone Public Entity
Believes the Current "Take Private" Proposal Significantly Undervalues Consolidated Communications
A full copy of the letter is below:
Consolidated Communications Holdings, Inc.
2116 South 17th Street
Attention: Special Committee of the Board of Directors
Dear Members of the Consolidated Communications Special Committee:
Wildcat Capital Management, LLC (together with its affiliated investment vehicles, "Wildcat," "we," or "our") is a long-term, patient investor which currently owns more than three million shares of Consolidated Communications Holdings, Inc. ("CNSL" or the "Company"), which we believe, based on public filings, makes us the Company's fifth-largest independent shareholder. As a sizeable shareholder of CNSL, we are delivering this letter to the Special Committee of CNSL's Board of Directors (the "Board") to detail our updated views on the contemplated take-private proposal from Searchlight Capital Partners, L.P. ("Searchlight") and British Columbia Investment Management Corporation ("BCI"), following our previous letter to the Special Committee dated June 15, 2023. We are not activist investors but have concluded, somewhat reluctantly, that at this juncture it is in the best interests of all CNSL shareholders for us to also make our views publicly known.
At a high level, we have confidence in the operating strategy that CNSL management is executing and believe that with its existing liquidity and build/financing flexibility, CNSL does not need to pursue strategic alternatives at this juncture. We are confident that CNSL can, and will, create significant shareholder value as a standalone public entity.
Further, Wildcat believes that Searchlight's and BCI's non-binding proposal to acquire all of CNSL's outstanding shares not already owned by such parties for
1) Wildcat Supports CNSL Management and its Current Strategy
- We commend Chief Executive Officer Bob Udell and the CNSL Board for leading the industry in identifying the attractive copper-to-fiber upgrade opportunity. Numerous peers followed CNSL's September 2020 fiber upgrade plan announcement and identified their own large scale upgrade projects. This list includes AT&T Inc., Frontier Communications Parent, Inc. ("Frontier") and Lumen, as well as financial sponsors like Apollo/Brightspeed and Searchlight/Ziply Fiber, to name a few.
- Wildcat recognizes the significant strategic and operational value contributed by Searchlight to CNSL following its September 2020 investment.
- In our view, CNSL has made key strategic decisions that support its ability to achieve desired penetration rates, including key personnel additions (most notably Gaurav Juneja, formerly of MetroNet, as the new President of Consumer) and refocusing on the door-to-door channel to drive subscriber growth. We believe that the recent operating results of AT&T Inc., Frontier and Ziply Fiber clearly show that CNSL's penetration targets can be achieved.
- CNSL management has communicated clearly that CNSL is on the brink of accelerating its fiber subscriber additions. CNSL's estimated
1 fiber investment in the ground is not yet reflected in EBITDA, but we are confident it will be soon and, as a result, believe that CNSL can achieve sustained mid-teens EBITDA growth in 2024 and beyond.$657 million
2) We Contend that CNSL Is Not in Duress and Does Not Need to Sell Itself at this Time
- Wildcat agrees with management's confidence in having a fully-funded fiber build plan. Since management publicly voiced this confidence in October 2021, CNSL has raised over
in additional liquidity via asset divestitures and has expressed assurance in its ability to complete and finance the upgrade opportunity.$600 million - Wildcat believes (i) available balance sheet liquidity, (ii) soon to be quickly growing EBITDA and declining leverage levels, (iii) flexibility in build timing, and (iv) the ability to access additional funds (which, in our view, would be minimal if required and only necessary in 2025-2026) means CNSL does not need to pursue strategic alternatives or dilutive financing at this time. In fact, in our opinion, this is the worst time for CNSL to contemplate a strategic transaction, as its EBITDA and free cash flow are temporarily depressed as a result of the massive capital expenditures being incurred in connection with the fiber upgrades, while the incremental revenues and EBITDA from the fiber build have yet to be realized.
- Further, the emergence of the fiber-to-the-home asset-backed securitization market offers incremental borrowing capacity at lower rates than the traditional debt market. Recent examples of companies accessing this market include MetroNet and Ting Inc., each of which raised leverage at 8.5x Securitized Net Cash Flow at 7.7
-8.2% all-in rates.2 - Details revealed on June 26, 2023 regarding the federal
Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Program that is part of President Biden's Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act suggest that CNSL may be eligible to receive between$42.5 billion and$200 million in incremental subsidies to offset the costs of and/or extend its build plan.$450 million
3) We Believe that CNSL is Extremely Undervalued at Searchlight's and BCI's Proposed
Our Analysis of the Future State Value Implies a Higher Valuation:
- Using publicly disclosed inputs from CNSL's management team combined with industry benchmarks and standards, Wildcat believes the terminal enterprise value of CNSL post-fiber upgrade within 5 years is conservatively
, translating into approximately$7 billion per share. We contend that CNSL has line of sight to achieving this valuation over the next 5 years as EBITDA expands materially.$28.25 - In our view, it would be a mistake to use current trough EBITDA to value CNSL's assets given that CNSL is not yet generating EBITDA from its fiber investments already in the ground. As such, our analysis focuses on asset value (Enterprise Value/Fiber Passing) and is based on conservative assumptions, including the cost to complete the upgrade and achieve mature penetration targets. Wildcat's "future state" value discounted back five years -- even at a risk-adjusted equity rate of return of
15% -implies a current fair value of per share, or$14.00 250% higher than the per share non-binding offer. As a result, we believe the implied current "fair" enterprise value is$4.00 , approximately$4 billion 40% above the enterprise value at the proposed$2.9 billion per share proposal. Because of CNSL's temporarily elevated leverage levels (as discussed in the prior section), this results in a magnified difference in equity value and the Company's share price. Further details on our analysis can be found in Appendix A of this letter.$4.00
Recent Comparable Transaction Analysis Supports our Valuation Assumptions:
- Wildcat believes the Apollo-managed funds'
acquisition of mostly rural ILEC assets in 20 states from Lumen to create Brightspeed is the most relevant, recent precedent transaction, and an analysis of this transaction supports our belief that the proposed offer from Searchlight and BCI significantly undervalues CNSL's shares.$7.5 billion - The Brightspeed transaction valued a passing at
on dramatically lower existing total fiber passing mix (Brightspeed's fiber passings are currently$1,154 4.5% of total passings vs.40.4% for CNSL). The same valuation per total passing would value CNSL at per share, a$5.40 35% premium to the non-binding offer. Relative to Brightspeed, Wildcat believes CNSL should also be given credit for its existing fiber spend ($4.00 /passing compared to the uninvested Brightspeed footprint) and the CNSL build cost advantage relative to Brightspeed ($250 /passing). As a result, the Brightspeed transaction implies that CNSL is conservatively worth approximately$121 per share, or$14.00 250% greater than the non-binding offer.$4.00 - Further, there are important differences between Brightspeed and CNSL that, in our view, favor CNSL: (i) CNSL is an operating entity with a strong management team in place rather than a corporate carve-out, (ii) CNSL's footprint has a higher target fiber mix (
76% vs.46% ), and (iii) CNSL has an upgrade cost advantage relative to other ILECs given its80% aerial plant. To be conservative, our analysis ignores (i) and (ii) and only gives credit to the upgrade cost advantage and the fact that CNSL has already deployed approximately upgrading copper to fiber (which hasn't produced incremental EBITDA to date). We offer further detail on this analysis in Appendix B.$657 million
In conclusion, Wildcat has full faith in CNSL's strategy and existing liquidity, build and financing flexibility, and does not view strategic alternatives to be necessary at this time to support CNSL's long-term objectives. In the interest of all CNSL shareholders, Wildcat urges the CNSL Special Committee to stay the course and not direct CNSL toward a full sale or dilutive financing that does not adequately value CNSL's assets. As detailed herein, we firmly believe that the non-binding proposal from Searchlight and BCI significantly undervalues CNSL's equity and that the reserve price of any offer should be no lower than
Sincerely,
Tom McConnon
Managing Director, Head of Public Equities
Wildcat Capital Management, LLC
About Wildcat Capital Management
Wildcat was established in 2011 as a single family investment office. The firm has a long term, flexible, family office-driven approach. Wildcat invests in multiple asset classes, including private equity, public equity and real estate.
Media Contact:
Eliza Ruggiero / Abigail Ruck
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wildcatcap@h-advisors.global
+1 (212) 371-5999
APPENDIX A
This analysis computes the future state value of CNSL in 5 years following its fiber upgrade project by burdening the valuation for the upgrade and success-based costs. Under this analysis, Wildcat conservatively estimates that CNSL's price per share post upgrade at
Key Assumptions:
- CNSL upgrades to 2 million total fiber passings (publicly disclosed target)
- Fiber penetration reaches
40% (a benchmark other ILECs, e.g., Frontier, have achieved) - Upgrade costs including success-based costs:
- Build costs of
per fiber passing (publicly disclosed target)$650 /subscriber cost to connect (publicly disclosed target)$750 marketing cost per gross add (conservative estimate based on industry benchmarking)$400 - Enterprise Value/Passing based on the lower-end of industry estimated ranges
- Assumes
EV/Passing for a "mature" fiber passing at$3,000 40% penetration; triangulation based on metrics Frontier shared at its August 2021 analyst day and where publicly traded cable companies trade; in addition, Ting recently completed a debt financing at /Passing (without giving value for the equity)$2,500 - Commercial & Carrier enterprise value in line with Lumen EV/Revenue
CNSL: Future State Value | |||||||
Future | |||||||
Current | Change | State (2028) | Notes | ||||
Passings | |||||||
Copper Passings | 1,564,889 | (937,482) | 627,407 | ||||
Fiber Passings | 1,062,518 | 937,482 | 2,000,000 | 2mm target shared by CNSL mgmt - Q4'22 earnings presentation | |||
Total Passings | 2,627,407 | - | 2,627,407 | ||||
Fiber Subscribers | |||||||
Fiber | 135,209 | 664,791 | 800,000 | ||||
Fiber Penetration | 12.7 % | 27.3 % | 40.0 % | ||||
Upgrade Costs/Passing and Subscriber | |||||||
Cost per Fiber Passing | Shared by CNSL mgmt - Q4'22 earnings presentation | ||||||
Cost to Connect per Subscriber | Shared by CNSL mgmt - Q4'22 earnings presentation | ||||||
Marketing Cost per Subscriber | Conservative estimate based on industry benchmarking | ||||||
Upgrade Costs ($mm) | |||||||
Cost per Fiber Passing | |||||||
Cost to Connect | |||||||
Marketing Cost | |||||||
Total Upgrade Costs | |||||||
Enterprise Value/Passing | |||||||
EV/Copper Passing | Low end of | ||||||
EV/Fiber Passing - Terminal ( | Low end of | ||||||
Enterprise Value ($mm) | |||||||
Commercial & Carrier EV at 1.5x Sales | Inline with LUMN (1.5x 2023 Revenue) | ||||||
Residential Copper EV | |||||||
Residential Fiber EV | |||||||
Implied Enterprise Value | |||||||
Debt | 3/31/23 CNSL 10Q | ||||||
Cash | ( | 3/31/23 CNSL 10Q | |||||
Unfunded Pension | 12/31/22 10K(updated annually) | ||||||
Searchlight Preferred | 3/31/23 CNSL 10Q | ||||||
Upgrade and Success-Based Costs | See above--includes passing upgrades, cost to connect, and marketing to reach | ||||||
Implied Equity Value | |||||||
Share Price | |||||||
Share Price Discounted | |||||||
Vs. | 252.6 % | ||||||
(1) Frontier (FYBR) noted | |||||||
(2) Frontier (FYBR) noted | |||||||
public cable companies (e.g. CHTR) valued at |
APPENDIX B
This analysis computes CNSL's valuation based on the results of the Apollo/Brightspeed transaction precedent, and then adjusts the valuation for (i) CNSL's existing fiber CapEx spend in 2021-2023 (Apollo/Brightspeed had de minimis fiber at acquisition) and (ii) CNSL's fiber build cost advantage versus its peers while burdening for CNSL's higher cost to connect. To be conservative, this analysis does not give CNSL credit for a number of other factors that should favorably impact valuation relative to Brightspeed. Wildcat conservatively estimates CNSL's price per share based on the most relevant transaction precedent at
Key Assumptions:
- CNSL has already spent
upgrading copper to fiber since 2021$657 million - Brightspeed will build at Frontier's estimated costs (
upgrade,$1,000 cost to connect)$600 - Fiber penetration reaches
40%
CNSL: Implied Valuation Using Brightspeed Transactional Comparable $ in MM | |||||||||||||||
Apollo / | CNSL vs. Brightspeed Valuation Adjustments | ||||||||||||||
Searchlight Offer | Brightspeed | Already Spent | CNSL Cost | Adjusted | |||||||||||
for CNSL at | Trans. Comp. | Fiber CapEx | Advantage | Valuation | Notes | ||||||||||
Enterprise Value | Source: LUMN | ||||||||||||||
Total Passings (Thousands) | 2,627 | 6,500 | Source: Brightspeed press release, 4/4/23 | ||||||||||||
Value/Total Passing ($/passing) | |||||||||||||||
Existing Fiber Passings (Thousands) | 1,063 | 290 | Source: LUMN Q3'22 earnings call (November 2022) | ||||||||||||
Target Fiber Passings (Thousands) | 2,000 | 3,000 | Source: Brightspeed press release, 8/22/22 | ||||||||||||
% Fiber - Target | 76.1 % | 46.2 % | |||||||||||||
% Fiber - Existing | 40.4 % | 4.5 % | |||||||||||||
CNSL EV Based on Value/Total Passings ($mm) | (1) | (2) | See footnotes (1) and (2) below | ||||||||||||
Debt | 3/31/23 CNSL 10Q | ||||||||||||||
Cash | ( | ( | ( | 3/31/23 CNSL 10Q | |||||||||||
Unfunded Pension | 12/31/22 10K (updated annually) | ||||||||||||||
Searchlight Preferred | 3/31/23 CNSL 10Q | ||||||||||||||
Equity Value ($mm) | |||||||||||||||
Value per Share | |||||||||||||||
Premium vs. | 35.0 % | 247.5 % | |||||||||||||
(1) | |||||||||||||||
(2)Value of CNSL cost advantage based on Brightspeed targets | |||||||||||||||
ADJUSTMENTS | |||||||||||||||
(1)CNSL Fiber CapEx Already Spent | |||||||||||||||
Existing Fiber CapEx ($mm) | |||||||||||||||
Value/Total Passing | Divided by 2,627k CNSL total passings | ||||||||||||||
(2)CNSL Net Cost Advantage | |||||||||||||||
Brightspeed Cost to Pass/Fiber Passing | "Similar to peers" - Aaron Sobel (Apollo Partner), November 2021; | ||||||||||||||
CNSL Cost to Pass/Fiber Passing | Shared by mgmt - Q4'22 earnings presentation | ||||||||||||||
Delta/Fiber Passing | |||||||||||||||
Value of CNSL Cost Advantage to Brightspeed ($mm) | Delta x Brightspeed's target incremental fiber passings | ||||||||||||||
Brightspeed Cost to Connect/Subscriber | Assuming metrics similar to Frontier (FYBR) metrics | ||||||||||||||
CNSL Cost to Connect/Subscriber | Shared by mgmt - Q4'22 earnings presentation | ||||||||||||||
Delta/Subscriber | ( | ||||||||||||||
Value of CNSL Cost Disadvantage to Brightspeed ($mm) | ( | Delta x Brightspeed's incremental fiber x | |||||||||||||
Total Value of Net CNSL Cost Advantage to Brightspeed ($mm) | Total value if Brightspeed could build/connect as cheaply as CNSL | ||||||||||||||
Value/Total Passing | Divided by 6,500k Brightspeed passings | ||||||||||||||
Total Value of Cost Advantage to CNSL Enterprise Value ($mm) | Value/total passing multipled by 2,627k CNSL passings |
1 Estimated by Wildcat as the sum of
2 Based on data from Bloomberg.
SOURCE Wildcat Capital Management