Spruce Point Capital Management Announces Investment Opinion: Releases Report and Strong Sell Research Opinion on Alpha Metallurgical Resources Inc. (NYSE: AMR)
Spruce Point Capital Management released a report claiming Alpha Metallurgical Resources (AMR) faces 40% to 60% downside risk in its stock price, estimating a drop to between $60.58 and $90.87 per share. The report highlights potential misstatements in coal production, revenues, and a hidden debt of up to $690 million. Additional concerns include inflated inventories, recent cash shortfalls, and the CFO’s past CPA suspension due to ethics issues. Allegations of inflated cash reserves, significant hidden debts, and questionable business practices raise serious concerns for investors.
- None.
- Up to $690 million in hidden debt obligations.
- Recent cash shortfalls and inflated inventories.
- CFO's CPA suspended for ethics violations.
- Cumulative core mining cash flow decreased from $436 million to $184 million from 2019-2021.
- Discrepancies in reported revenues from coal sales to Brazil.
- Concerns over inflated reserve estimates and independence of reserve reports.
- Evidence suggesting financial strain and possible mismanagement of cash.
- Reported non-standard cash flow metrics affecting cash generation perception.
NOTE TO EDITORS: The Following Is an Investment Opinion Issued by
Highlights That Our Forensic Review of Alpha Finds Staggering Evidence to Suggest Misstated Coal Production, Revenues and Expenses, Up to
Warns Investors That Alpha’s CFO Had His CPA Suspended, Noting A Multiyear Failure to Take Ethics Courses. In Addition, The State of WV Named the Company And The CFO In A Lawsuit Alleging Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Millions In Liabilities. The Lawsuit Was Settled
Warns That Temporarily Improving Coal Markets Are Masking Alpha’s Otherwise Poor Operating Performance. By Adjusting For Discontinued Operations and One-Time Tax Refunds, We Estimate Cumulative Core Mining Operating Cash Flow From 2019 - 2021 Declines From
After Examining
Questions Why Alpha, With Among the Industry’s Highest Proposed Civil Penalties With the MSHA, Claims It Is Almost Debt-Free And Is Using Company Cash Flow To Pay Dividends And Repurchase Stock, While Management Sold An Estimated
Sees
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Spruce Point Report Overview
Founded in 2016 as
Despite its best efforts to shed its dark past, we believe Alpha is still a dirty coal company with challenged mining assets, problematic financial reporting and accounting practices, and insiders that put their own interests ahead of shareholders, the environment, and public interests. Key findings from our report on Alpha include:
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Questionable Business Activities and Reporting Between Closely Associated Companies. Many of Contura’s executives came from ANR. Spruce Point observes that Alpha made numerous reporting changes to how it classifies freight and handling revenues and costs. At first, it allocated all the costs to the Trading & Logistics segment. Then, it allocated costs among its various regional production segments. Alpha’s freight and handling reporting per ton is suspiciously higher than all of its
U.S. reporting coal peers. Contura’s old Trading & Logistics business was buying a substantial amount of coal from ANR. We find evidence of negative revenue in Q4 2018. We also show that 2017 segment revenues were quietly changed between Contura / ANR from to$478 . In the intercompany eliminations Alpha shows$566 million of purchased coal which is more than the costs for the entire segment which was$566.5 million . Furthermore, the merger proxy shows the intercompany business to have revenues matching costs, yet Contura was claiming the segment produced$543.2 million of EBITDA.$89 million
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Substantial Missing Export Revenue to
Brazil . The “export” story is central to Alpha’s investment case. Alpha says thatBrazil is a critical market with export revenue exceeding10% of total revenue. Therefore, we estimate thatBrazil accounted for a minimum of and$226 of export revenue (inclusive of freight) in 2021 and 2020, respectively. Spruce Point has sourced$142 million Brazil import records amounting to 626k and 866k metric tons shipped in 2020 and 2021. Using published reference prices, we estimate Alpha’s revenues from coal sold toBrazil were closer to to$95 , materially below reported figures.$99 million
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Evidence of Inflated Reserves and Concerns of Independence on the Reserve Report. Spruce Point warns investors about putting too much reliance on Alpha’s stated reserves. At IPO, it promoted over 1.3 billion of proven and probable reserves. Since then, it acquired 611 million tons from the ANR merger in 2018 and divested approximately 733 million of PRB and NAPP reserves. Production has amounted to approximately 86 million tons from 2016 – 2021. Yet, after revisions and implementing new
SEC reporting guidelines, proven and probable reserves are just 351 million tons. Spruce Point observes that Alpha has used a relatively small firm inVirginia as its “Qualified Expert”. The consent form is increasingly being signed by a principal lower down the chain of command. Furthermore, there are subtle language changes being made that raise concerns. Notably, there are hints to suggest that the initial reserve estimates may not have been “independent”.
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Evidence of
Critical Operating Expense Avoidance Through Dominion Terminal – An “Affiliate”. Alpha’s investment case relies heavily on its ability to export coal to foreign markets. It prominently touts its65% ownership ofDominion Terminal Associates (DTA) which allows it to store, and efficiently facilitate the movement of coal through seabound shipping routes. However, there is evidence that Alpha has booked revenues from customers using DTA, and avoided recognition of DTA’s operating expenses. Alpha claims DTA is an equity affiliate, and records non-cash “other expenses” related to DTA that does not affect EBITDA or operating cash flow. DTA is a money losing-asset that requires annual capital contributions, but none of these expenses affect operating metrics. Based on a relative reporting analysis between Alpha (65% ) and Arch Resources (35% ), it also appears that Alpha may be under-reporting DTA costs.
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Evidence of Overstated Cash, Significant Cash Shortfalls, and Substantial “Hidden” Off-Balance Sheet Debts. A recent analysis of Alpha’s interest income shows a precipitous decline in Q3 and Q4 2021. Inclusive and exclusive of restricted cash and investments, we estimate it earned just 6 and 2 basis points, respectively of annualized interest on cash. This could suggest periods where intra and/or inter-quarter, it was short on cash. Underscoring our concern of cash overstatement, we find irreconcilable differences in cash spent on share repurchases and cash raised through warrants being exercised between the Statements of Equity accounts and Statements of Cash Flow. We also observe its “restricted” cash and assets has been increasing. Looking carefully at its “Cash Interest Expense” disclosed at the bottom of the Statements of Cash Flows, we observe that it rose by
in 2021 despite lowering its Term-Loan balance through optional debt repayments, and shrinking off-balance sheet liabilities such as Surety Bonds and Letters of Credit. Based on this unexplained$13.8 million of cash interest cost, and making some assumptions about the associated interest expense, we estimate$13.8m -$138 of “hidden” interest-bearing debt. Alpha’s days sales outstanding have been increasing which indicates difficulty collecting cash. We observe that$690 million China was briefly listed as a major customer in late 2021. It is possible Alpha sold coal intoChina to boost sales, but received poor payment terms. We also observe that freight and logistics costs per ton sold increased markedly by122% from Q2 2021 to Q1 2022. Higher transportation costs generally make Alpha’s export coal less attractive to foreign buyers. Lastly, we see a deterioration of earnings quality with net income recently exceeding operating cash flow.
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Core Cash Flow From Mining Masked By Non-Standard Cash Flow Statement Format. We believe Alpha’s cash generation shouldn’t be taken at face value. To illustrate,
48% of cumulative operating cash flow from 2019 – 2021 came from tax refunds and interest on NOL carryback claims, most of which were higher than initial guidance provided in 2019. For comparison, during the same period, Arch and Peabody generated12% and8% of cash flow from refunds, respectively. These “one-time” refunds won’t be repeated, and will become a major headwind going forward. Secondly, Alpha’s cash flow statements include discontinued operations, whereas under best practices for financial reporting, it should separate out discontinued cash flows. Recent divestitures include NAPP and PRB operations. By adjusting the cash flow statement to remove these items, and making further adjustments to include the capital cost of operating the DTA export terminal, we estimate that core cash from mining operations is materially overstated. As presented, 2019 – 2021 cumulative cash from operations is . However, our pro forma analysis illustrates that cumulative core cash from continuing mining operations was$436 million .$184 million
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Follow-The-Money, Insiders Sold Heavily
20% Below the Current Price. Alpha trades at an unjust premium for what we believe are lower quality coal operations and assets. In fact, according to Good Jobs First, an organization which tracks corporate violations, Alpha (and its predecessor ANR) leads the entireU.S. mining industry with a record in fines and penalties mostly tied to safety and environmental compliance. We believe Alpha should trade at a discount to peers to incorporate its poor track record and our concerns around accounting, financial reporting, and financial strains being observed with “hidden” liabilities. We believe investors also underappreciate customer risk in the Alpha story. We believe$564m China , a recent large customer, will dramatically expand imports fromMongolia .India , a29% customer in Q1’22, has not been growing met coal imports YTD. Coal prices are projected to decline as more supply comes to market and the Ukraine War shortage premium subsidies. We believe management have been aggressive sellers of stock in a non-transparent way. After FY 2021 earnings results in March, and a repurchase program was announced, management sold$150m 56% of its total stock holdings. However, betweenMarch 10th and the filing of the Proxy Statement onMarch 30, 2022 , we estimate insiders sold of stock in the$24 million range ($117 20% below the current price) without filing a single timely Form 4 to notify investors. In addition, warrants issued in 2016 were recently exercised by a large holder. We estimate40% –60% downside risk to –$60.58 per share.$90.87
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Please note that the items summarized in this press release are expanded upon and supported with data, public filings and records, and images in Spruce Point’s full report. As a reminder, our full report, along with its investment disclaimers, can be downloaded and viewed at www.SprucePointCap.com.
As disclosed, Spruce Point has a short position in
About Spruce Point
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