ISS Recommends Stockholders of Pitney Bowes Vote FOR Meaningful Board Changes Proposed by Hestia Capital
Hestia Capital Management, holding an 8.5% stake in Pitney Bowes (NYSE: PBI), announced that the independent proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has recommended stockholders elect four of Hestia's director nominees—Milena Alberti-Perez, Todd Everett, Katie May, and Kurt Wolf—at the upcoming 2023 Annual Meeting. The recommendation underscores a demand for significant boardroom change after a decade of underperformance and poor governance at Pitney Bowes.
ISS noted stockholders' discontent with the current board and emphasized the need for independent oversight to enhance capital allocation, corporate governance, and the company's long-term strategy. The urgency for change is highlighted by Pitney Bowes’ declining financial performance, highlighting a critical moment for shareholders to reevaluate board composition.
- ISS endorses Hestia's nominees for board change, reflecting strong support from stockholders.
- Hestia seeks to improve capital allocation and governance, addressing long-term strategy issues.
- Pitney Bowes has faced over a decade of financial underperformance and governance issues.
- The company's net debt to adjusted EBITDA ratio has nearly doubled from 2.7x in FY2013 to 5.0x in FY2022.
- Concerns raised about the current board's effectiveness and past governance failures.
A Leading Independent Proxy Advisory Firm Recommends Stockholders Elect Four of Hestia’s Director Candidates to Pitney Bowes’ Nine-Member Board
Recommended Director Candidates Possess Experience in Capital Allocation, Corporate Governance, Debt Reduction, the Shipping and
“We appreciate that ISS has endorsed our case for meaningful boardroom change and recommended that stockholders vote for four of our nominees –
In its report, ISS validates practically every aspect of Hestia’s case for meaningful change:1
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“In summary, shareholders have endured a decade of underperformance and disappointment, there are unanswered questions and serious concerns about the path forward, and power on the board is concentrated in the hands of those directors who objectively have the most potential for a conflict of interest by virtue of their past experience and tenure.”
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“[…] ISS has received volumes of unsolicited inbound statements of support for the dissident. This suggests that there is an elevated likelihood that all five dissident nominees will be elected. If this occurs, there is no specific reason to believe that
Lance Rosenzweig cannot be effective as a director and interim CEO.”
- “Ultimately, nearly every objective measure contradicts the board's position, and PBI has a history of failing to deliver on important self-established expectations, which diminishes the trust that shareholders can place in the board's vision for the future… Thus, board composition and the ability of directors to exercise effective, independent oversight of management are particularly important considerations.”
- “Moreover, there is certainly a sense of urgency after ten years of decline, but PBI does have adequate time to weigh its options … if the reconstituted board, after close examination of the available alternatives, concludes that management change is necessary.”
- “[…] the dissident is attuned to the most important issues plaguing PBI. This understanding was evident during engagement with ISS.”
- “… there are concerns about the willingness of the leadership team to be objective in all cases when considering GEC moving forward.”
- “Power has instead been concentrated in the hands of those directors who objectively have the most potential to be ineffective when overseeing management.”
- “[…] management has a history of failing to meet self-established expectations, yet is now asking for the trust of shareholders. Thus, board composition and the ability of directors to exercise effective, independent oversight of management are particularly important considerations.”
- “The board has made bizarre and arguably misleading statements about the dissident, including criticisms about the dissident's experience at GameStop.”
- “The dissident has raised credible concerns about the trajectory and prospects of GEC, related corporate governance considerations, and other factors, such as competitive pressures and headwinds facing GEC, as well as the impact of GEC on PBI's overall financial condition.”
ISS details Pitney Bowes’ governance deficiencies and poor performance:
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“[…] selecting appropriate additions and establishing the correct board leadership structure are just as important as ongoing refreshment. It is therefore unclear why the board selected Dutkowsky to succeed Roth as board chair. Dutkowsky and Lautenbach are both former employees of IBM, spending at least 20 and 27 years at the company, respectively. Lautenbach is also on record in a
March 2019 third-party media spotlight of Dutkowsky stating, ‘I have had the opportunity to work withBob Dutkowsky for over 20 years ...’ This preexisting relationship raises questions about Dutkowsky's suitability to serve as board chair in this setting, which calls for an unquestionably independent counterbalance to management.”
- “A similar dynamic exists with Sanford and Busquet […] Busquet is the longest-tenured director on ballot, and she is a longstanding member of the governance committee. Thus, Busquet bears more responsibility than any other incumbent director for deficiencies with board composition.”
- “[…] deficiencies extend to other links between directors beyond those highlighted above. For instance, Sanford and Guilfoile both serve on the board of the Interpublic Group of Companies, where Roth served as CEO and board chair.”
- “TSR has historically been disappointing in both absolute and relative terms.”
- “The board notes that PBI has reduced debt over the past decade. However, PBI's credit ratings have been consistently revised downward over the course of the transformation, and PBI's net debt to adjusted EBITDA ratio has nearly doubled from 2.7x in FY2013 to 5.0X in FY2022.”
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As a reminder, Hestia is seeking to elect five highly qualified and independent candidates to Pitney Bowes’ nine-member Board at the Company’s Annual Meeting on
To maximize the likelihood of a turnaround at
Visit www.TransformPBI.com to download a copy of our investor presentation and receive future updates.
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1 Permission to quote ISS was neither sought nor obtained. Emphases added.
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