LARGE SHAREHOLDER ADDRESSES JAMES RIVER GROUP BOARD FOLLOWING DISCRETIONARY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE BONUSES
James River Group Holdings (NASDAQ: JRVR) faces shareholder criticism over the Board's recent decision to award approximately $2.115 million in discretionary management bonuses for the 2024 performance period. Gregory and Scott Fortunoff, who hold nearly 2% of JRVR's outstanding shares, expressed shock at this decision given the company's significant underperformance.
The shareholders highlighted that JRVR's stock price has declined approximately 59% over the past year, while book value dropped about 30%. In 2024, the company reduced its annual cash dividend from $0.20 to $0.05 per share due to deteriorating financial results. The letter criticizes the Board, noting that except for Matthew Botein, they collectively own less than 0.5% of outstanding shares, while receiving approximately $1.331 million in group compensation.
The Fortunoffs propose that any bonuses should be awarded in stock options rather than cash, and unused portions should be distributed to shareholders as a special dividend. They threaten further action if the Board fails to prioritize capital preservation and shareholder interests.
James River Group Holdings (NASDAQ: JRVR) affronta critiche da parte degli azionisti per la recente decisione del Consiglio di attribuire circa 2,115 milioni di dollari in bonus discrezionali per la gestione per il periodo di performance del 2024. Gregory e Scott Fortunoff, che detengono quasi il 2% delle azioni in circolazione di JRVR, hanno espresso shock per questa decisione, data la significativa sotto-performance dell'azienda.
Gli azionisti hanno evidenziato che il prezzo delle azioni di JRVR è diminuito di circa 59% nell'ultimo anno, mentre il valore contabile è sceso di circa 30%. Nel 2024, l'azienda ha ridotto il suo dividendo annuale in contante da $0,20 a $0,05 per azione a causa del deterioramento dei risultati finanziari. La lettera critica il Consiglio, osservando che, ad eccezione di Matthew Botein, essi possiedono collettivamente meno dello 0,5% delle azioni in circolazione, mentre ricevono circa 1,331 milioni di dollari in compensi di gruppo.
I Fortunoff propongono che eventuali bonus siano assegnati sotto forma di opzioni su azioni piuttosto che in contante, e che le porzioni non utilizzate siano distribuite agli azionisti come dividendo straordinario. Minacciano ulteriori azioni se il Consiglio non darà priorità alla preservazione del capitale e agli interessi degli azionisti.
James River Group Holdings (NASDAQ: JRVR) enfrenta críticas de los accionistas por la reciente decisión de la Junta de otorgar aproximadamente 2.115 millones de dólares en bonificaciones discrecionales de gestión para el período de rendimiento de 2024. Gregory y Scott Fortunoff, que poseen casi el 2% de las acciones en circulación de JRVR, expresaron su sorpresa por esta decisión dada la significativa subrendimiento de la compañía.
Los accionistas destacaron que el precio de las acciones de JRVR ha disminuido aproximadamente 59% en el último año, mientras que el valor contable cayó alrededor de 30%. En 2024, la compañía redujo su dividendo en efectivo anual de $0.20 a $0.05 por acción debido a los resultados financieros deteriorados. La carta critica a la Junta, señalando que, excepto por Matthew Botein, ellos poseen colectivamente menos del 0.5% de las acciones en circulación, mientras reciben aproximadamente 1.331 millones de dólares en compensación grupal.
Los Fortunoff proponen que cualquier bonificación se otorgue en opciones sobre acciones en lugar de efectivo, y que las porciones no utilizadas se distribuyan a los accionistas como un dividendo especial. Amenazan con tomar más acciones si la Junta no prioriza la preservación del capital y los intereses de los accionistas.
제임스 리버 그룹 홀딩스 (NASDAQ: JRVR)는 2024년 성과 기간 동안 약 211만 5천 달러의 재량 관리 보너스를 수여하기로 한 이사회의 최근 결정에 대해 주주들의 비판에 직면하고 있습니다. JRVR의 발행 주식의 거의 2%를 보유한 그레고리와 스콧 포르투노프는 회사의 중대한 저조를 감안할 때 이 결정에 충격을 받았다고 밝혔습니다.
주주들은 JRVR의 주가가 지난 1년 동안 약 59% 하락했으며, 장부 가치는 약 30% 감소했다고 강조했습니다. 2024년에는 재무 성과 악화로 인해 연간 현금 배당금을 주당 $0.20에서 $0.05로 줄였습니다. 이 편지는 매튜 보테인을 제외하고 이사회가 발행 주식의 0.5% 미만을 소유하고 있으며, 약 133만 1천 달러의 그룹 보상을 받고 있다고 비판하고 있습니다.
포르투노프는 모든 보너스가 현금 대신 주식 옵션으로 수여되어야 하며, 사용되지 않은 부분은 특별 배당금으로 주주에게 분배되어야 한다고 제안합니다. 이사회가 자본 보존과 주주 이익을 우선시하지 않으면 추가 조치를 취하겠다고 위협합니다.
James River Group Holdings (NASDAQ: JRVR) fait face à des critiques de la part des actionnaires concernant la récente décision du Conseil d'attribuer environ 2,115 millions de dollars en primes discrétionnaires de gestion pour la période de performance 2024. Gregory et Scott Fortunoff, qui détiennent près de 2% des actions en circulation de JRVR, ont exprimé leur choc face à cette décision compte tenu de la sous-performance significative de l'entreprise.
Les actionnaires ont souligné que le prix de l'action de JRVR a chuté d'environ 59% au cours de l'année écoulée, tandis que la valeur comptable a diminué d'environ 30%. En 2024, l'entreprise a réduit son dividende annuel en espèces de 0,20 $ à 0,05 $ par action en raison de la détérioration des résultats financiers. La lettre critique le Conseil, notant qu'à l'exception de Matthew Botein, ils possèdent collectivement moins de 0,5% des actions en circulation, tout en recevant environ 1,331 millions de dollars en rémunération de groupe.
Les Fortunoff proposent que toute prime soit attribuée sous forme d'options d'actions plutôt qu'en espèces, et que les parties non utilisées soient distribuées aux actionnaires sous forme de dividende exceptionnel. Ils menacent de prendre d'autres mesures si le Conseil ne priorise pas la préservation du capital et les intérêts des actionnaires.
James River Group Holdings (NASDAQ: JRVR) sieht sich Kritik von Aktionären wegen der kürzlichen Entscheidung des Vorstands gegenüber, etwa 2,115 Millionen Dollar an diskretionären Managementboni für den Leistungszeitraum 2024 zu vergeben. Gregory und Scott Fortunoff, die fast 2% der ausstehenden Aktien von JRVR halten, äußerten sich schockiert über diese Entscheidung, angesichts der erheblichen Underperformance des Unternehmens.
Die Aktionäre hoben hervor, dass der Aktienkurs von JRVR im letzten Jahr um etwa 59% gefallen ist, während der Buchwert um etwa 30% gesunken ist. Im Jahr 2024 reduzierte das Unternehmen seine jährliche Bardividende von 0,20 $ auf 0,05 $ pro Aktie aufgrund der sich verschlechternden finanziellen Ergebnisse. In dem Schreiben wird der Vorstand kritisiert, da sie, mit Ausnahme von Matthew Botein, insgesamt weniger als 0,5% der ausstehenden Aktien besitzen, während sie etwa 1,331 Millionen Dollar an Gruppenvergütung erhalten haben.
Die Fortunoffs schlagen vor, dass alle Boni in Form von Aktienoptionen und nicht in bar vergeben werden sollten, und dass nicht genutzte Teile als Sonderdividende an die Aktionäre verteilt werden sollten. Sie drohen mit weiteren Maßnahmen, wenn der Vorstand es versäumt, den Kapitalerhalt und die Interessen der Aktionäre zu priorisieren.
- None.
- Stock price declined approximately 59% over the past year
- Book value dropped approximately 30%
- Annual cash dividend reduced from $0.20 to $0.05 per share
- $2.115 million in discretionary bonuses awarded despite poor performance
- Board members collectively own less than 0.5% of shares (excluding one member)
- High Board compensation of $1.331 million despite company underperformance
Insights
This shareholder letter represents a significant escalation in investor discontent that could trigger broader governance changes at James River Group. The nearly 2% shareholders are publicly challenging what appears to be a fundamental misalignment between executive compensation and shareholder returns.
The $2.115 million discretionary bonus award amid catastrophic performance metrics - a 59% share price collapse and 30% book value destruction - represents an extraordinary governance failure in the property & casualty insurance sector, where alignment between risk management discipline and executive incentives is paramount. This disconnect is particularly troubling following the company's 75% dividend reduction from
The timing of this public confrontation is strategically significant as it coincides with proxy season, substantially increasing the probability that proxy advisory firms will recommend withholding votes for compensation committee members. While the Fortunoffs' 2% ownership is insufficient for a full control contest, it provides adequate standing for a board representation campaign that could force substantial governance reforms.
The reference to "long and costly restructuring" indicates JRVR is already undergoing significant operational transformation, making leadership stability crucial. This public dispute introduces material uncertainty regarding management continuity and strategic direction at precisely the wrong moment.
The shareholders' explicit demand to either eliminate cash bonuses or convert them to performance-based stock options, coupled with their threat of "further steps," signals potential for an activist intervention that would likely accelerate leadership changes. Insurance industry governance disputes of this nature typically culminate in board refreshment, strategic reviews, or management changes - all of which would introduce additional execution risk for a company already struggling to restore investor confidence.
Gregory and Scott Fortunoff, who together with their affiliates, hold a substantial equity interest in James River Group Holdings, Ltd. (NASDAQ: JRVR) (the "Company"), sent the following letter to the Company's Board of Directors (the "Board") regarding the Board's recent decision to significantly increase the cash incentive awards for Company management for the 2024 performance period despite the Company's ongoing underperformance.
March 10, 2025
The Board of Directors
James River Group Holdings, Ltd.
Clarendon House
Wellesley House, 2nd Floor
90 Pitts Bay Road
Members of the Board,
We are writing to you as a group of shareholders of James River Group Holdings, Ltd. (the "Company") that own almost
Last Friday, we were very shocked to learn from the Company's Form 8-K filing that the Board had decided to use its discretion "to increase the cash incentive award amounts for the 2024 performance period." This "discretionary" bonus totaled approximately
We note that, in 2024, the Company decided to significantly decrease its annual cash dividend from
This Board of Directors as a group, except for Mr. Matthew Botein, owns less than half of
We would like the Board to explain to shareholders their decision to use their "discretion" to offer bonuses to management based on the Company's current performance. We would also like to know what led the Board to determine that it was better to reward management for the Company's continued underperformance rather than use these available funds to increase the annual cash dividend to the Company's shareholders or to grow the Company's business. While we believe that no bonus is warranted for the Company's performance in 2024, if the Board insists on providing management with some type of bonus, we strongly suggest that, at a minimum, the Board only award bonuses in the form of incentive stock options and divide the "discretionary" amounts awarded to management in order to align such performance bonuses with the performance of the Company's stock price and book value in 2024. Further, we believe that the unused portion of these "discretionary" awards should be given to the shareholders in the form of a special dividend.
We expect your prompt response and a clear public commitment from the Board to prioritize the preservation of capital. We are prepared to take further steps to ensure the Board remains accountable and acts in the best interests of shareholders.
Sincerely,
Gregory Fortunoff
CONTACT:
Gregory Fortunoff
greg@jaftex.com
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SOURCE Gregory Fortunoff
FAQ
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