Mason Capital Management Highlights Corporate Governance Failures and Significant Shareholder Value Destruction Under Grifols Board of Directors
Mason Capital Management, holding 2.1% of Grifols (GRFS) Class A shares, sent a critical letter to the Board highlighting corporate governance failures and value destruction. The letter opposes a rumored Brookfield transaction that allegedly undervalues the company. Mason criticizes the Board's history of poor capital allocation, citing €4.5 billion in debt-financed acquisitions since 2014 that only added €136 million in EBITDA. The investor points out conflicts of interest, particularly regarding board member Tomas Daga and Osborne Clarke Spain's involvement in multiple transactions. Mason calls for immediate implementation of corporate governance reforms and suggests the company is worth €20+ per share versus the rumored €12 Brookfield offer.
Mason Capital Management, che detiene il 2,1% delle azioni di Classe A di Grifols (GRFS), ha inviato una lettera critica al Consiglio evidenziando fallimenti nella governance aziendale e distruzione di valore. La lettera si oppone a una presunta transazione con Brookfield che, a quanto pare, svaluterebbe l’azienda. Mason critica la storia del Consiglio riguardo alla cattiva allocazione di capitali, citando 4,5 miliardi di euro in acquisizioni finanziate tramite debito dal 2014, che hanno aggiunto solo 136 milioni di euro in EBITDA. L'investitore segnala conflitti di interesse, in particolare riguardo al membro del consiglio Tomas Daga e il coinvolgimento di Osborne Clarke Spagna in varie transazioni. Mason chiede l'attuazione immediata di riforme nella governance aziendale e suggerisce che l'azienda valga oltre 20 euro per azione rispetto all'offerta di 12 euro proposta da Brookfield.
Mason Capital Management, que posee el 2,1% de las acciones de Clase A de Grifols (GRFS), envió una carta crítica a la Junta señalando fallas en la gobernanza corporativa y destrucción de valor. La carta se opone a una supuesta transacción con Brookfield que supuestamente subvalorarían a la empresa. Mason critica el historial de la Junta en la mala asignación de capital, citando 4.5 mil millones de euros en adquisiciones financiadas con deuda desde 2014 que apenas han añadido 136 millones de euros en EBITDA. El inversor señala conflictos de interés, específicamente en relación con el miembro de la junta Tomas Daga y la participación de Osborne Clarke España en múltiples transacciones. Mason pide la implementación inmediata de reformas de gobernanza corporativa y sugiere que la compañía vale más de 20 euros por acción frente a la oferta de 12 euros de Brookfield.
메이슨 캐피탈 매니지먼트는 그리폴스(GRFS) 클래스 A 주식의 2.1%를 보유하고 있으며, 이사회에 비판적인 편지를 보내 기업 거버넌스 실패 및 가치 훼손을 강조했습니다. 이 편지는 회사의 가치를 저평가하는 것으로 알려진 브룩필드와의 거래에 반대합니다. 메이슨은 2014년 이후로 부채로 자금을 조달한 인수합병이 45억 유로에 달하나, EBITDA에 1억 3600만 유로만 추가했다고 하며 이사회의 자본 배분의 부족한 역사에 대해 비판했습니다. 또한, 메이슨은 이사인 토마스 다가와 오스본 클락 스페인이 여러 거래에 연루되어 있는 것과 같은 이해 상충을 지적합니다. 메이슨은 기업 거버넌스 개혁을 즉각 시행할 것을 촉구하며, 회사의 가치는 브룩필드의 공급가인 12유로에 비해 20유로 이상일 것이라고 제안했습니다.
Mason Capital Management, détenant 2,1 % des actions de Classe A de Grifols (GRFS), a envoyé une lettre critique au Conseil d'administration, soulignant des défaillances en matière de gouvernance d'entreprise et de destruction de valeur. La lettre s'oppose à une transaction présumée avec Brookfield qui, apparemment, sous-évalue la société. Mason critique l'historique du Conseil concernant une mauvaise allocation du capital, en citant 4,5 milliards d'euros d'acquisitions financées par la dette depuis 2014 qui n'ont ajouté que 136 millions d'euros d'EBITDA. L'investisseur souligne des conflits d'intérêts, notamment en ce qui concerne le membre du conseil Tomas Daga et l'implication d'Osborne Clarke Espagne dans plusieurs transactions. Mason appelle à la mise en œuvre immédiate des réformes de gouvernance d'entreprise et suggère que l'entreprise vaut plus de 20 euros par action par rapport à l'offre présumée de 12 euros de Brookfield.
Mason Capital Management, das 2,1% der A-Aktien von Grifols (GRFS) hält, hat einen kritischen Brief an den Vorstand gesendet, in dem es Mängel in der Unternehmensführung und Wertvernichtung hervorhebt. Der Brief widerspricht einem gerüchteweisen Geschäft mit Brookfield, das angeblich die Firma unterbewertet. Mason kritisiert die Geschichte des Vorstands in Bezug auf schlechte Kapitalallokation und verweist auf 4,5 Milliarden Euro an verschuldungsfinanzierten Übernahmen seit 2014, die lediglich 136 Millionen Euro an EBITDA beigesteuert haben. Der Investor weist auf Interessenkonflikte hin, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit dem Vorstandsmitglied Tomas Daga und dem Engagement von Osborne Clarke Spanien in mehreren Transaktionen. Mason fordert die sofortige Umsetzung von Reformen in der Unternehmensführung und schlägt vor, dass das Unternehmen über 20 Euro pro Aktie wert ist, im Vergleich zu dem angeblichen Angebot von 12 Euro von Brookfield.
- Company's underlying business shows positive momentum
- Independent shareholders control 69% of Class A voting shares, enabling potential governance reforms
- Current valuation at 8.5x 2025E EBITDA suggests significant upside potential
- Board's poor capital allocation resulted in €4.5B debt for only €136M EBITDA addition
- High leverage ratio at 5.1x net debt/EBITDA
- Significant conflicts of interest in Board composition and transaction committee
- Share price depression due to governance issues and short seller report
- Delayed appointment of independent directors
Sends Letter to Board Detailing Board’s Conflicts of Interest and History of Poor Capital Allocation
Expresses Urgent Need for Independent Directors and Proper Oversight to Unlock Value
Believes Rumored Brookfield Transaction Substantially Undervalues Grifols
Historical Forward EV/EBITDA Multiple (Graphic: Business Wire)
In the letter, Mason highlights numerous corporate governance failures that have resulted in Grifols’ depressed share price and a rumored transaction with affiliates of Brookfield Asset Management LP which dramatically undervalues the Company. Mason calls on the Board to immediately implement a series of actions to address its conflicts of interest, improve oversight, and ultimately unlock shareholder value.
The full text of the letter follows:
November 8, 2024
Grifols, S.A.
Avinguda de la Generalitat 152-158
08174 Sant Cugat del Vallès
Dear Grifols Board Members and Shareholders;
Mason Capital is a significant Grifols shareholder, controlling ~
The current board has a long history of poor capital allocation. As illustrated below, every large (
Grifols Large M&A | ||||||||||||||
LTM Q3'24 EBITDA | ||||||||||||||
Price | Reported | GRF % | Economic | Price / | ||||||||||
Date | Paid | Own. (1) | EBITDA | Economic | ||||||||||
Novartis Diagnostic NAT | Jan-14 | € |
1,240 |
100 |
% |
|||||||||
Hologic NAT | Jan-17 |
|
1,750 |
100 |
% |
|||||||||
Total Diagnostics | € |
2,990 |
€ |
143 |
|
100 |
% |
€ |
143 |
|
20.9x | |||
Biotest | Apr-22 |
|
1,461 |
|
(9 |
) |
70 |
% |
|
(7 |
) |
NA | ||
Total Large M&A | € |
4,451 |
€ |
134 |
|
€ |
136 |
|
32.6x | |||||
Grifols’ consolidated net leverage is currently 5.1x. Elevated leverage left Grifols vulnerable to a spurious January 2024 short report, the focus of which was a purportedly unsustainable balance sheet. Had the Company not engaged in the series of value-destroying transactions summarized above, net leverage would be a reasonable 3.6x. At that prudent leverage level, the Company could have executed a share repurchase program to defend against the short report or even avoided the report altogether. However, the uncertainty caused by the short report is still negatively impacting Grifols’ share price today.
Capitalization Ex-Diagnostics and Biotest | |||||||||||||||
Diagnostics | |||||||||||||||
PF | |||||||||||||||
Q3'24 | NAT | SRAAS | Biotest | Q3'24 | |||||||||||
Net Financial Debt | € |
8,128 |
|
€ |
(2,990 |
) |
€ |
1,564 |
€ |
(1,461 |
) |
€ |
5,241 |
||
Market Cap (1) |
|
7,745 |
|
|
- |
|
|
- |
|
- |
|
|
7,745 |
||
SRAAS Stake (2) |
|
(437 |
) |
|
- |
|
|
437 |
|
- |
|
|
- |
||
TEV | € |
15,436 |
|
€ |
(2,990 |
) |
€ |
2,001 |
€ |
(1,461 |
) |
€ |
12,986 |
||
Q3'24 LTM EBITDA (3) | € |
1,605 |
|
€ |
(143 |
) |
€ |
9 |
|
€ |
1,471 |
||||
Net Leverage | 5.1x | 3.6x | |||||||||||||
TEV Multiple | 9.6x | 8.8x | |||||||||||||
(1) Market Capitalization implied by Class A price on 11/08/24 | |||||||||||||||
(2) Residual SRAAS Stake value based on SRAAS share price as of 11/08/24 | |||||||||||||||
(3) Credit Agreement EBITDA |
Mason Capital is concerned that these illogical transactions are due to highly conflicted directors on the Company’s Board. The most tenured Board members are either family members or Tomas Daga, the Grifols family’s closest advisor and a founding partner of Osborne Clarke Spain.
Since 2014, Osborne Clarke Spain has advised on at least 16 separate M&A transactions worth ~
Poor capital allocation by a conflicted Board is a symptom of serious governance problems at Grifols. Having a director who benefits from the same M&A transactions which have materially harmed shareholders should trouble all investors, the CNMV, and all directors. It is also concerning that two non-voting members of the supposedly Independent Transaction Committee formed to evaluate a potential
Poor corporate governance, which is reflected by the ~
Despite perpetuating blatant conflicts of interest and destroying shareholder value, the family and Tomas Daga again may be attempting to take advantage of a weak Board by purchasing the Company at a depressed price that they themselves have caused. Have they no shame? To wit, a special deal with
The Grifols family is a minority investor in Grifols. Although the family has controlled the company and management in the past, shareholders have not been organized. The voting majority lies with independent shareholders. Independent shareholders have already requested access to the Board by way of the exercise of their proportional representation right in accordance with Article 243 of the Spanish Companies Act.
The proportional representation right provided by Article 243 allows for majority shareholders to assert control. For each ~
One independent director has been nominated. Others may follow. Current directors may anticipate being part of a contested proxy contest which shines a light on the company’s corporate governance failings.
The Board should immediately implement the following actions to begin to fix ongoing corporate governance issues:
- Provide access to the Board to Mr. Paul Herendeen as candidate designated by the grouped minority shareholders.
- Remove the Osborne Clarke members from the Independent Transaction Committee.
- Disclose all payments for the past 15 years by the Company to Osbourne Clark Spain, and the amount of compensation Tomas Daga has received from Osborne Clark Spain attributable to Grifols-related matters.
- Begin an open sale process to maximize value, including solicitations to all parties to purchase the company. Any non-solicitation agreement currently in place should be terminated immediately.
-
Re-schedule the Capital Markets day. The positive momentum in the business is clear and canceling the Capital Markets day only benefited the family and
Brookfield at the expense of independent shareholders.
To directly address the potential
Before the short report, Grifols hadn’t traded lower than 12.0x EBITDA over the past 10 years (as shown in the appendix). Mason Capital is confident that with an independent board and proper corporate governance, Grifols will regain at least its lowest historical market multiple given the asset quality. At 12.0x EBITDA, Grifols is worth
Potential Valuation | ||||||||||
Source/Commentary | ||||||||||
Consolidated EBITDA | @ |
NCI Share | € |
2,012 |
|
2025E Consensus | ||||
(-) Diagnostic NCI | € |
179 |
45 |
% |
|
(81 |
) |
Consensus '25E EBIT (+) LTM D&A | ||
(+/-) Biotest NCI | € |
73 |
30 |
% |
|
(22 |
) |
Mason estimate | ||
Economic EBITDA | € |
1,910 |
|
|||||||
EBITDA Multiple | 12.0x | 10 yr low multiple pre-short report | ||||||||
TEV | € |
22,915 |
|
|||||||
(-) Reported Q3'24 Net Debt |
|
(8,128 |
) |
Does not give credit for future FCF | ||||||
(-) Reported Q3'24 Lease Liabilities |
|
(1,080 |
) |
|||||||
(+) Residual SRAAS Stake Value |
|
438 |
|
SRAAS price as of 11/07/24 | ||||||
(-) BPC/Haema Call Option Strike Value |
|
(498 |
) |
|||||||
(+) Intercompany Loan to BPC/Haema |
|
123 |
|
Page 19 2Q'24 filing | ||||||
Equity Value | Class A | Class B | € |
13,770 |
|
|||||
(/) Total Shares |
|
426 |
261 |
|
|
688 |
|
|||
Share Price | € |
20.03 |
|
Regards,
Kenneth M Garschina
Managing Member
Mason Capital Management
Appendix:
Osborne Clarke Engagements:
GRIFOLS SA | 11/08/24 | ||||||||
Osborne Clarke Advisory Roles (€ in millions) | |||||||||
Value in | |||||||||
Grifols | Reported | Exchange | |||||||
Date | Acquirer | Target | Description | Advisors | Curncy. | Rate ( /€) | Value (€) | ||
6/18/2024 | Haier Group | Shanghai RAAS | Divestment of Grifols' |
Osborne Clarke, JunHe LLP, Nomura | ¥ |
12,500 |
0.13 |
€ |
1,600 |
4/25/2022 | Grifols | Biotest AG | Acquisition of |
Osborne Clarke, Proskauer Rose, Nomura, UBS | € |
1,461 |
1.00 |
€ |
1,461 |
3/11/2022 | Synthetic Biologics | VCN Biosciences | Divestment of Grifols' |
Osborne Clarke | $ |
75 |
0.92 |
€ |
69 |
12/1/2021 | GIC | Biomat |
Divestment of minority stake in Grifols' |
Osborne Clarke, Proskauer Rose, Nomura | $ |
1,000 |
0.88 |
€ |
883 |
4/7/2021 | Grifols | Kedrion | Acquisition of seven |
Osborne Clarke | $ |
55 |
0.84 |
€ |
46 |
4/7/2021 | Grifols | BPL Plasma | Acquisition of 25 U.S.-based plasma donation centers from BPL Plasma, Inc., a subsidiary of Bio Products Laboratory Holdings Limited. | Osborne Clarke | $ |
370 |
0.84 |
€ |
312 |
3/9/2021 | Grifols | GigaGen | Acquisition of remaining |
Osborne Clarke, Proskauer Rose | $ |
80 |
0.84 |
€ |
67 |
12/15/2020 | Grifols | Alkahest | Acquisition of remaining equity of Alkahest, Inc. | Osborne Clarke, Proskauer Rose | $ |
146 |
0.82 |
€ |
120 |
10/1/2020 | Grifols | Green Cross | Acquisition of 11 plasma collection centers from Green Cross | Osborne Clarke, Stikeman Elliott, Nomura | $ |
90 |
0.85 |
€ |
77 |
10/1/2020 | Grifols | GC Pharma | Acquisition of plasma fractionation, immunoglobulin, and albumin purification plants in |
Osborne Clarke, Stikeman Elliott, Nomura | $ |
370 |
0.85 |
€ |
315 |
8/1/2018 | Grifols | Biotest US | Acquisition of |
Osborne Clarke | $ |
286 |
0.85 |
€ |
244 |
6/4/2018 | Grifols | Haema AG | Acquisition of |
Osborne Clarke | € |
220 |
1.00 |
€ |
220 |
1/31/2017 | Grifols | Hologic NAT donor screening unit JV | Acquisition of Hologic's share of NAT donor screening unit JV | Osborne Clarke, Proskauer Rose | $ |
1,850 |
0.95 |
€ |
1,750 |
3/3/2016 | Grifols | Progenika | Acquisition of |
Osborne Clarke | € |
25 |
1.00 |
€ |
25 |
3/4/2015 | Grifols | Alkahest | Acquisition of |
Osborne Clarke | $ |
38 |
0.90 |
€ |
34 |
1/9/2014 | Grifols | Novartis diagnostics business unit | Acquisition of transfusion diagnostics unit of Novartis | Osborne Clarke, Proskauer Rose, Nomura | $ |
1,675 |
0.74 |
€ |
1,240 |
Total | € |
8,463 |
August 31st Letter to Independent Transaction Committee:
The following is a letter that was sent to the Independent Transaction Committee on Saturday, August 31st, 2024.
Members of the Independent Transaction Committee:
Mason Capital Management LLC is a registered investment advisor to funds and accounts holding approximately
Given the significance of the Potential Transaction to all shareholders and the clear conflict of interest impacting several members of the Board, it is paramount in our view that shareholders be able to communicate candidly with the Independent Transaction Committee about the Potential Transaction, free of undue influence by the conflicted members of the Board. To that end, we believe that shareholder communications with the Independent Transaction Committee should not be shared with the wider Board (which includes conflicted directors). Please advise us promptly of any rules or procedures that are in place to govern the confidentiality of shareholder communications with the Independent Transaction Committee concerning the Potential Transaction.
For the same reason, we are concerned that Ms. Núria Martín Barnés and Ms. Laura de la Cruz Galán are acting as secretary to the Independent Transaction Committee. Both are current or former attorneys with Osborne Clarke, a firm with substantial ties to the Grifols family and conflicted directors, making their involvement with the Independent Transaction Committee wholly inappropriate. Please confirm that oversight will be rectified immediately and the Independent Transaction Committee will secure non-conflicted personnel to act as secretary to the committee.
We look forward to your prompt response so that we, and presumably other non-Grifols family shareholders, can share our views with you about the Potential Transaction confidentially and assist the Independent Transaction Committee with fulfilling its mandate to act in the best interests of the Company and all stakeholders.
We would like to reiterate all the above and note that Grifols has not removed the conflicted individuals from the Independent Transaction Committee.
Historical Forward EV/EBITDA Multiple:
See Historical Forward EV/EBITDA Multiple chart above.
Source List:
- Independent Transaction Committee (Link)
- Núria Martín Barnés Profile – Board of Directors Profile (Link)
- Laura de la Cruz Galán Profile – Board of Directors Profile (Link)
- Tomás Dagá Gelabert – Board of Directors Profile (Link)
- Novartis Diagnostics NAT Deal Announcement (Link)
- Hologic NAT Deal Announcement (Link)
-
Annual Report 2022 (Link)
- Biotest Purchase Price and Ownership of Share Capital (pg. 3)
-
Q3 2024 Results Investor Presentation (Link)
- SRAAS Value (pg. 14 FN) – SRAAS earnings not included in definition of Credit Agreement EBITDA
- Net Financial Debt (pg. 31)
- Credit Agreement EBITDA (pg. 31)
- Diagnostics EBITDA (pg. 33)
- Biotest EBITDA (pg. 33)
-
Second Quarter 2024 Consolidated Interim Financial Statements (Link)
- Residual SRAAS Stake (pg. 17)
- Purchase Option on BPC Plasma, Inc. and Haema AG (pg. 32)
About Mason Capital Management LLC
Mason Capital Management LLC is an absolute return focused investment firm that combines deep fundamental analysis with hard catalysts to drive value creation. Founded in July 2000 by Ken Garschina and Mike Martino, Mason’s strategies range from event-driven investing to corporate carve-outs and control acquisitions.
View source version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20241107873955/en/
Jonathan Gasthalter/Sam Fisher
Gasthalter & Co.
+1 (212) 257-4170
Source: Mason Capital Management LLC
FAQ
What is Mason Capital's stake in Grifols (GRFS)?
What is the rumored Brookfield transaction price for Grifols (GRFS)?
What is Grifols' (GRFS) current net leverage ratio?