Waterous Energy Fund Requisitions Special Meeting of Shareholders of Greenfire Resources Ltd. for the Purpose of Replacing the Entire Board of Directors
Waterous Energy Fund (WEF), owning 43% of Greenfire Resources (TSX/NYSE: GFR), has requisitioned a special meeting to replace the entire board of directors. WEF cites three main reasons: consistently poor performance, with production missing targets by 29-42% while capital expenditure increased 494%; board self-enrichment through consulting agreements and change-of-control benefits; and wasteful resource management through multiple shareholder rights plans and legal actions. WEF proposes six new directors and aims to hold the meeting by January 2025. The company's stock has underperformed with a -31.3% return since its de-SPAC transaction, compared to the XEG index's +10.7%.
Waterous Energy Fund (WEF), che possiede il 43% di Greenfire Resources (TSX/NYSE: GFR), ha richiesto un'assemblea straordinaria per sostituire completamente il consiglio di amministrazione. Il WEF cita tre motivi principali: performance costantemente deludenti, con la produzione che manca gli obiettivi del 29-42% mentre la spesa in conto capitale è aumentata del 494%; auto-arricchimento del consiglio attraverso contratti di consulenza e benefici in caso di cambio di controllo; e gestione inefficiente delle risorse attraverso piani di diritti degli azionisti multipli e azioni legali. Il WEF propone sei nuovi direttori e intende tenere l'assemblea entro gennaio 2025. Il valore delle azioni dell'azienda ha registrato una performance negativa, con un ritorno del -31,3% dalla sua transazione di de-SPAC, rispetto al +10,7% dell'indice XEG.
Waterous Energy Fund (WEF), que posee el 43% de Greenfire Resources (TSX/NYSE: GFR), ha solicitado una reunión especial para reemplazar a toda la junta directiva. WEF cita tres razones principales: rendimiento consistentemente pobre, con producción que no alcanza los objetivos entre un 29% y un 42%, mientras que el gasto de capital ha aumentado un 494%; auto-enriquecimiento de la junta a través de acuerdos de consultoría y beneficios por cambio de control; y gestión ineficaz de recursos mediante múltiples planes de derechos de los accionistas y acciones legales. WEF propone seis nuevos directores y tiene como objetivo celebrar la reunión antes de enero de 2025. Las acciones de la empresa han tenido un desempeño deficiente con un retorno del -31,3% desde su transacción de de-SPAC, en comparación con el +10,7% del índice XEG.
Waterous Energy Fund (WEF)는 Greenfire Resources (TSX/NYSE: GFR)의 43%를 소유하고 있으며, 전체 이사회를 교체하기 위한 특별 회의를 요청했습니다. WEF는 세 가지 주요 이유를 제시하고 있습니다: 일관되게 저조한 성과, 생산 목표가 29-42% 미달하며 자본 지출이 494% 증가했습니다; 자문 계약 및 변경 통제 혜택을 통한 이사회 자산 증가; 여러 주주 권리 계획 및 법적 조치를 통한 비효율적인 자원 관리. WEF는 여섯 명의 새로운 이사를 제안하며 2025년 1월까지 회의를 개최할 계획입니다. 회사의 주식은 de-SPAC 거래 이후 -31.3%의 수익률을 기록하며, XEG 지수의 +10.7%와 비교됩니다.
Waterous Energy Fund (WEF), détenant 43% de Greenfire Resources (TSX/NYSE: GFR), a demandé une assemblée spéciale pour remplacer l'intégralité du conseil d'administration. WEF cite trois raisons principales : des performances constamment médiocres, avec une production manquant les objectifs de 29 à 42% tandis que les dépenses d'investissement ont augmenté de 494% ; enrichissement personnel du conseil via des contrats de conseil et des avantages lors de changements de contrôle ; et une gestion inefficace des ressources à travers plusieurs plans de droits des actionnaires et procédures judiciaires. WEF propose six nouveaux administrateurs et vise à tenir la réunion d'ici janvier 2025. L'action de l'entreprise a affiché un rendement de -31,3% depuis sa transaction de de-SPAC, par rapport à +10,7% pour l'indice XEG.
Waterous Energy Fund (WEF), der 43% von Greenfire Resources (TSX/NYSE: GFR) besitzt, hat eine außerordentliche Sitzung beantragt, um den gesamten Vorstand zu ersetzen. WEF nennt drei Hauptgründe: konstant schlechte Leistung, wobei die Produktion die Ziele um 29-42% verfehlt hat, während die Investitionsausgaben um 494% gestiegen sind; Selbstbereicherung des Vorstands durch Beratungsverträge und Vorteile bei Kontrollwechsel; und verschwenderisches Ressourcenmanagement durch mehrere Aktionärsrechtepläne und rechtliche Schritte. WEF schlägt sechs neue Direktoren vor und plant, die Sitzung bis Januar 2025 abzuhalten. Die Aktie des Unternehmens hat eine schlechte Leistung gezeigt mit einer Rendite von -31,3% seit der de-SPAC-Transaktion, im Vergleich zu +10,7% des XEG-Index.
- Market showed 15.4% outperformance vs XEG index following WEF's announcement to acquire shares
- WEF owns 43% stake as largest shareholder, providing strong backing for proposed changes
- 2023 production missed forecast by 29% (17.6 Mbbls/day vs 24.8 Mbbls/day)
- 2024 production guidance lowered 42% from initial forecast
- 2024 capital expenditure increased 494% to C$95M from initial C$16M forecast
- Stock underperformed XEG index by 42% since September 2023
- Board approved US$3.5M consulting agreement with major shareholder MBSC
- Multiple legal actions and rights plans increasing corporate expenses
WEF is seeking to replace all four current Board members (Matthew Perkal, Robert Logan, Jonathan Klesch and Derek Aylesworth), for three reasons described below.
1. The Board Has Overseen Consistently Poor Performance on All Fronts
a. Under the Board's leadership, production has consistently missed expectations
While seeking approval for the de-SPAC transaction in late 2022, Greenfire initially forecasted 2023 production of 24.8 Mbbls per day, which was later revised down to 20.4 Mbbls per day in September 2023.1 Actual 2023 production came in at 17.6 Mbbls per day,
Similarly, Greenfire initially forecasted 2024 production of 33.4 Mbbls per day in late 2022, then revised this forecast down to 25.1 Mbbls per day in September 2023, then lowered guidance again to 23.5 Mbbls per day in early 2024, then lowered guidance again to 20.5 Mbbls per day in August 2024. Greenfire's current 2024 guidance is now 19.5 Mbbls per day,
Since providing its initial forecast Greenfire has lowered 2024 production guidance four times, including twice in the last two quarters, and has not met production guidance during a single quarter as a public company.
b. The Board has approved consistent increases to capital spending, with no increase in production volumes
While seeking approval for the de-SPAC transaction in late 2022, Greenfire initially forecasted 2024 capital expenditures of
c. The market has lost confidence in this Board
Since the completion of the de-SPAC transaction under which Greenfire raised capital at
Given Greenfire's history of failing to live up to its projections, it is no wonder that Greenfire has underperformed the XEG by
d. The market is clearly looking for a change in sponsorship
During the two days following WEF's announcement of its agreement to acquire Greenfire shares, Greenfire's stock outperformed the XEG by
2. The Board Has Pursued Personal Self-Enrichment at Expense of Its Shareholders
a. The Board is being run by a single board member for his firm's personal enrichment
One of the current Board members, Jonathan Klesch, has confirmed that the Board is being controlled by Matthew Perkal, partner and Head of SPACs and Special Situations at Brigade Capital Management LP ("Brigade") and interim chair of Greenfire. In a message sent from Mr. Klesch in September 2024 after the enactment of the First Rights Plan, Mr. Klesch stated as follows: "Matt is running the show and to be honest I don't feel comfortable".
Brigade and M3 Partners LP (collectively "MBSC") were the original sponsors of the SPAC transaction, in which they invested capital at
By April 2024, Greenfire's falling share price had reduced the value of MBSC's investment by approximately
Greenfire has not disclosed any detail regarding the services being provided by MBSC for Greenfire's benefit, but it would appear that its efforts are not working. WEF is not aware of a similar consulting agreement between a Canadian oil and gas company and a significant shareholder.
b. The Board is not aligned with its shareholders under a change of control
Greenfire has asserted that the strategic alternatives process is the only way to provide value to shareholders. Not highlighted by Greenfire is that, if a change of control were to occur, the current members of the Board would receive substantially different payouts than the remainder of Greenfire's common shareholders. This creates a bias for the Board to pursue an immediate change of control at any price, rather than simply grow the per share value of Greenfire as a standalone entity.
Specifically, in a hypothetical change of control at
- 3,250,788 SPAC warrants held by MBSC, Mr. Logan and Mr. Klesch with a strike price of
US per Greenfire share, which would otherwise not be exercisable, but would immediately become due and payable in cash at a price of approximately$11.50 US under a change of control.8$6.9 million - 1,798,696 Performance Warrants, RSUs, Performance Share Units and Deferred Share Units held by MBSC, Mr. Logan, Mr. Klesch and Mr. Aylesworth would become immediately due and payable at a price of
US under a change of control.$13.8 million - On a combined basis, these payments amount to approximately
US in extra value payable to the current Board members or, in the case of Mr. Perkal, to his nominating shareholder, under a change of control (or an extra approximately$20.6 million US per share versus their current common shareholdings of 8,325,825 shares), which would not be payable to the remainder of the common shareholders.$2.48
- 3,250,788 SPAC warrants held by MBSC, Mr. Logan and Mr. Klesch with a strike price of
Furthermore, it should be noted that in July 2024, in preparation for the so-called strategic alternatives process, the Board voted to approve a substantial increase in severance payments due to management, payable only in the event of a change of control, equal to an aggregate potential payment of approximately
3. The Board Appears Intent on Wasting Shareholder Resources Instead of Growing the Value of Greenfire
a. The Board has enacted two unprecedented shareholder rights plans and launched two additional legal cases to maintain their entrenchment
Two days after WEF announced its investment in Greenfire, the Board approved the First Rights Plan to maintain their entrenchment. Unlike typical shareholder rights plans which are made in the face of pending take-over bids for the whole business and are meant to restrict future actions, the First Rights Plan was first-of-its-kind in two ways: (1) it sought to unwind a binding, private agreement on a retroactive basis, and (2) it was approved by the Board despite no take-over bid for the company having been made.
Greenfire also commenced a cross-application to cease-trade the purchase transactions between WEF and Greenfire's selling shareholders, in an attempt to deprive its shareholders from exercising their fundamental rights to trade their shares.
The Alberta Securities Commission ("ASC") cease traded the First Rights Plan and denied Greenfire's cross-application on November 6, 2024. However, one hour after the ASC's decision, Greenfire chose to enact a second shareholder rights plan (the "Second Rights Plan") and pursue an injunction against former shareholders (an action WEF is not party to) which WEF believes has no reasonable chance of success, and thus will waste shareholder resources. WEF is not aware of any company enacting a second shareholder rights plan immediately after another has been cease-traded by the ASC.
b. Only one group has benefited from the Board's actions: their external advisors
Since the beginning of its litigation against WEF, Greenfire and Brigade have retained the services of two investment banks, three law firms and multiple consultants. And of course, Greenfire continues to maintain its
WEF hereby requests that Greenfire publish on its website a current, itemized listing of the costs incurred to date by Greenfire, with shareholders' money, in pursuit of their own entrenchment.
Summary
In summary, it has become clear that the current Greenfire Board, in the face of poor operational performance, a declining share price and blatant self-dealing, has resorted to desperate corporate lawfare maneuvers to entrench themselves despite overwhelming evidence that their shareholders and the market has lost confidence in them.
Fortunately, Greenfire shareholders have another option. WEF was attracted to Greenfire likely for the same reason as many of its fellow shareholders: Greenfire owns a high-quality asset, but the company's value is currently clouded by mismanagement and a dysfunctional Board. WEF has a track record of creating value by simplifying complex corporate situations so that the underlying value of the assets can shine through, and it is confident it can once again do so with Greenfire.
WEF is requesting that the Board call a meeting of Greenfire shareholders to replace the current Board of four with six highly-qualified directors (the "Shareholder Nominees") who bring significant oil and gas, operational, public company, capital markets, mergers and acquisitions and financial experience. WEF requests that the Meeting be held promptly, and in any event by no later than January 2025.
Finally, contrary to Greenfire's baseless claims in its November 20, 2024 press release, WEF has no intention of proposing a combination of Greenfire and
WEF Nominees
Henry Hager
Mr. Hager is currently a Managing Director of WEF, a role he has served since January 2018, and a director of Strathcona Resources Ltd. ("
Brian Heald
Mr. Heald has a 30-year track record in the Canadian energy and capital markets sector with lengthy experience as a Managing Director, Investment Banking, with CIBC World Markets, HSBC Securities, Nesbitt Thomson, Deloitte and ATB Capital Markets. Mr. Heald has acted as the lead/co-lead underwriter and financial advisor on over 300 capital markets and M&A transactions representing over
Andrew Kim
Mr. Kim currently is the Chief Financial Officer of WEF, a role he has served since December 2016, and a director of
David Knight Legg
Originally from
David Roosth
Mr. Roosth is currently a Managing Director of WEF, and a director of
Adam Waterous
Mr. Waterous founded WEF in December 2016 and is currently Managing Partner and Chief Executive Officer of WEF. Mr. Waterous is also the Executive Chairman and a director of
The information contained in this news release does not and is not meant to constitute a solicitation of a proxy within the meaning of applicable securities laws. Although WEF has requisitioned the Meeting of shareholders of Greenfire, there is currently no record or Meeting date and shareholders are not being asked at this time to execute a proxy in favour of the Shareholder Nominees. In connection with the Meeting, WEF may file a dissident information circular in due course in compliance with applicable securities laws.
This press release is for informational purposes only and is not intended to and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer, or an intention to offer, to subscribe for or buy or an invitation to purchase or subscribe for any securities, nor shall there be any sale, issuance or transfer of securities in any jurisdiction in contravention of applicable law. Such an offer to purchase securities would only be made pursuant to a registration statement, prospectus, tender offer, takeover bid circular, management information circular or other regulatory filing filed by WEF with the
Forward-Looking Information Cautionary Statement
This document contains certain forward-looking statements and information (referred to herein as "forward-looking statements") within the meaning of applicable securities laws. Forward-looking statements are often, but not always, identified by the use of words such as "anticipate", "believe", "plan", "scheduled", "intend", "objective", "continuous", "ongoing", "estimate", "expect", "may", "will", "project", "should", or similar words suggesting future events, circumstances or outcomes. In particular, this document contains forward-looking information concerning the actions and strategy of the Shareholder Nominees, including the anticipated benefits thereof to Greenfire and Shareholders.
Forward-looking statements are based upon the opinions and expectations of management of WEF as at the effective date of such statements and, in some cases, information supplied by third parties. Although WEF believes the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are based upon reasonable assumptions and that information received from third parties is reliable, it can give no assurance that those expectations will prove to have been correct. Forward-looking statements are subject to certain risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events or outcomes to differ materially from those anticipated or implied by such forward-looking statements. These risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, such things as changes in general economic conditions in
The forward-looking statements contained in this document are made as of the date hereof and WEF does not undertake any obligation to update or to revise any of the included forward-looking statements, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking statements contained in this document are expressly qualified by this cautionary statement.
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1 | Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1966287/000121390023067010/f424b30823_greenfire.htm |
2 | AAV, ARX, ATH, BIR, BTE, CJ, CNQ, CVE, GXE, HWX, IMO, IPCO, KEC, KEL, LCX, LGN, MEG, NVA, OBE, PEY, POU, RBY, SDE, SGY, SU, TOU, TVE, VET, VRN, WCP. |
3 | Reflects share price performance between September 20, 2023 and November 18, 2024 of Greenfire and peers, including dividends, based on Greenfire placement price of |
4 | Reflects Greenfire share price performance between September 16, 2024 and September 18, 2024. |
5 | Reflects Greenfire share price performance between September 19, 2024 and November 18, 2024. |
6 | Assuming RSUs were granted on date MBSC was amalgamated with Greenfire (April 4, 2024); Greenfire share price of approximately |
7 | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1966287/000121390024041269/ea0205682-424b3_greenfire.htm |
8 | Reflects Black-Scholes option value of |
SOURCE Waterous Energy Fund Management Corp.
FAQ
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