Legion Partners Issues Letter to Genesco Shareholders Regarding the Company’s Misaligned Executive Compensation Structure
Legion Partners Asset Management, owning approximately 5.9% of Genesco's shares, has issued a letter urging shareholders to vote on a WHITE proxy card to elect four directors to the Board. The letter criticizes the current executive compensation structure, alleging misalignment with shareholder interests, particularly under the leadership of Compensation Committee members who have overseen poor performance. Legion Partners advocates for candidates who will enhance transparency and tie executive pay more closely to performance metrics, aiming to improve operational effectiveness and shareholder value.
- Legion Partners has nominated qualified candidates for the Board to enhance governance.
- The proposed changes aim to improve executive compensation alignment with performance.
- Current executive compensation is criticized as misaligned with shareholder interests.
- Long-standing executives have overseen a decline in operational performance and total shareholder return.
Legion Partners Asset Management, LLC (together with its affiliates, “Legion Partners” or “we”), which collectively with the other participants in its solicitation beneficially owns approximately
Source: SEC Filings, Legion Partners’ estimates. Note: FY 2018 Operating Profit excluded
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June 14, 2021
Dear Fellow Shareholder,
Legion Partners and the other participants in its solicitation beneficially own approximately
Notably, two of the directors we are seeking to replace are long-standing members and leaders of the Board’s Compensation Committee:
- Matthew C. Diamond was Chair of the Compensation Committee from 2005 through 2019 and remains a member. He also currently serves as Lead Independent Director and Chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee. Mr. Diamond has served on the Board for more than 20 years.
- Joanna Barsh is the current Chair of the Compensation Committee and has served as a member since 2015. She has spent 40 years at McKinsey & Company, where current Genesco Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Mimi Vaughn worked for several years and former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Robert Dennis worked for 13 years. Ms. Barsh has served on the Board for nearly eight years.
As key members of the Compensation Committee for years, we believe Mr. Diamond and Ms. Barsh have presided over a misaligned executive compensation structure, effectively rewarding management with unjustified increases in pay during periods of long-term stagnation and sustained underperformance.
We believe one of the Board’s most critical roles as a steward of shareholder capital is to ensure efficient and well-aligned executive compensation structures. This role is especially important at Genesco, which has a combined Chairman and Chief Executive Officer position and apparent interconnectivity among insiders. The way in which directors execute their compensation oversight responsibilities reflects how seriously they take their duties to shareholders and how much they respect our capital.
We Urge Shareholders to Closely Assess Genesco’s Broken Executive Compensation Criteria.
Genesco’s own compensation philosophy states that its program is intended to help the Company achieve its financial and strategic objectives and motivate Genesco’s management through the use of appropriate incentives tied to performance and market value. The Company punctuates its philosophy by claiming it has “the ultimate objective of building shareholder value.”
Unfortunately, we believe Genesco’s program has failed miserably in relation to its intended goals. We also believe the incumbent directors have neglected to take action to correct this clear deficiency despite years of unmistakable evidence of dramatic underperformance. Rather than “building shareholder value,” Mr. Diamond and Ms. Barsh have been key members of a Compensation Committee that created and maintained a program which has driven deteriorating operational performance, lagging total shareholder returns and an increasingly inefficient cost structure – to us, Genesco’s executive compensation program lacks meaningful ties to actual business performance.
Genesco’s annual incentive program is based on a concept known as Economic Value Added (“EVA”), which on its face appears to be an attractive concept. However, as is typically the case, the devil is in the details. The reality is that Genesco’s EVA program is overly complex and has had seemingly little positive impact on operating performance or ultimate shareholders returns, as evidenced by our analysis.
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GCO Relative TSR over Tenure vs. |
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Relevant Tenure Periods |
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Core Peer
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ISS Peer
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S&P 1500
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S&P 500 |
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Russell
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5-Year |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
10-Year |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
16-Year (Diamond Chaired Comp. Committee) |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
20-Year (Diamond Joined the Board) |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
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( |
Source: SEC Filings, Legion Partners’ Estimates, Capital IQ – Data as of 04/09/2021 |
(1) Core Peer Group includes BOOT, DBI, FL, SCVL, CAL, DKS, HIBB, WWW, CROX, DECK, SHOO, SKX. |
(2) ISS Peer Group includes ANF, GES, SCVL, BKE, CROX, HIBB, SHOO, ZUMZ, ANF, CAL, DBI, URBN, CHS, EXPR, PLCE, WWW. |
(3) S&P 1500 Footwear Index includes CROX, DECK, NKE, SKX, SHOO, WWW. |
Note: Total Shareholder Return (“TSR”) figures as of respective Board appointment date through 04/09/2021. Assumes that Matthew C. Diamond was appointed on January 1st in his year of appointment due to lack of detailed information. |
What is worse, however, is the Board’s astonishing belief that its EVA program provides sufficient alignment and that there is no need to tie equity awards to performance-based vesting requirements. During Mr. Diamond and Ms. Barsh’s tenures on the Compensation Committee, the Board has granted more than
As Charlie Munger once stated, “[i]f the incentives are wrong, the behaviors will be wrong. I guarantee it.” In the case of Genesco, Mr. Munger’s prediction rings true, as the utter lack of long-term performance-based requirements in the compensation plan appear to have resulted in predictably poor performance. In fact, if you examine the Company’s performance from the top-line to the bottom-line since Mr. Diamond became the Chair of the Compensation Committee in 2005, you can see that gross margins have declined, operating costs have gone up, and both operating income margin and return on invested capital (“ROIC) have been cut in half or worse.
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Fiscal Year |
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'06-'20 |
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($mm) |
2006 |
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2020 |
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Change |
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Net Sales |
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Gross Profit |
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Gross margin % |
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(243bps) |
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Selling and administrative expenses |
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% of Net Sales |
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214bps |
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Operating income |
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Operating income margin % |
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(500bps) |
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Net earnings (loss) |
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Net earnings (loss) margin % |
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(209bps) |
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ROIC (1) |
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(1,025bps) |
Source: Company SEC Filings as reported. Legion Partners’ Estimates |
Note: 1. ROIC is defined as: ROIC = NOPAT / 4Q Trailing Average Debt & Equity, where NOPAT = Reported Operating Profit – Tax Expenses and 4Q Trailing Average Debt & Equity = 4Q Average of Net Debt + Shareholders Equity. Assuming consistent tax rate of |
Legion Partners’ Slate Possesses a Vision for Helping Fix Genesco’s Misaligned Executive Compensation Program.
Shareholders cannot expect a new day at Genesco without first electing the right directors for this pivotal moment in time. Fortunately, the candidates we have nominated have the independence, objectivity and public company experience to help improve the Company’s compensation practices, long-term alignment, and overall operational rigor and performance.
If elected, our nominees will pursue specific improvements to Genesco’s executive compensation program in an effort to provide greater transparency to shareholders and better alignment of interests. Our slate believes this can be accomplished by replacing the Company’s opaque and unnecessarily complicated annual incentive program with straightforward metrics that tie a significant majority of long-term executive compensation to rigorous performance-based equity vesting requirements.
We encourage all shareholders seeking to protect their investment to vote on the WHITE proxy card for our full slate. If you have any questions or require assistance as you consider how to vote, please contact our proxy solicitor (Kingsdale Advisors) at GCO@kingsdaleadvisors.com.
Sincerely,
Chris Kiper |
Ted White |
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Managing Director |
Managing Director |
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Legion Partners Asset Management |
Legion Partners Asset Management |
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About Legion Partners
Legion Partners is a value-oriented investment manager based in Los Angeles, with a satellite office in Sacramento, California. Legion Partners seeks to invest in high-quality businesses that are temporarily trading at a discount, utilizing deep fundamental research and long-term shareholder engagement. Legion Partners manages a concentrated portfolio of North American small-cap equities on behalf of some of the world’s largest institutional and high-net-worth investors. Learn more at www.LegionPartners.com.
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FAQ
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