Ancora Issues Open Letter to the Board of Directors of Everbridge Regarding the Urgent Need to Explore Strategic Alternatives
Ancora Holdings Group, a significant shareholder of Everbridge (EVBG), claims the company is undervalued and advocates for a sale to a well-capitalized acquirer, suggesting a potential share price of over $70, reflecting a 90% premium. The letter criticizes Everbridge's Board for misalignment with shareholders, ineffective management, and problematic executive compensation practices. Ancora highlights Everbridge's leading position in the Critical Event Management market but notes poor stock performance and executive turnover, advocating for immediate strategic alternatives.
- Potential acquisition could unlock significant shareholder value, with estimates indicating a share price above $70.
- Everbridge holds a dominant position in the Critical Event Management market, showcasing a robust technological platform.
- Company's diversified product offerings and high gross margins indicate a favorable financial model.
- Everbridge has underperformed significantly compared to peers, with long-term returns down by 75.9% over one year.
- High turnover among executives, with over 80% of named officers having departed since 2018, raises concerns about management stability.
- The Board's decision to empower the current co-CEOs despite ongoing operational issues suggests a lack of accountability.
Asserts a Sale to a Well-Capitalized Acquirer Can Unlock
Contends Many Financial Sponsors and Potentially Strategic Buyers Could Have Interest in Acquiring Everbridge
Argues the Board Is Misaligned with Shareholders and Rife with Potential Conflicts of Interest While Endorsing Extremely Problematic Executive Compensation Practices
***
Members of the Board of Directors,
We were first attracted to Everbridge because of its leading and dominant share of a large and still-growing market. As the market leader in Critical Event Management (“CEM”), we admire Everbridge’s mission to keep people safe and businesses running. The need for Everbridge’s technology offering has never been more important now that natural disasters, terrorism and cyber threats are on the rise.
Having pioneered the market for critical communications solutions, Everbridge should be commended for its early vision in helping protect people around the world by powering mass notification for both public sector and corporate entities. Building on this leadership position, Everbridge has successfully evolved from a single-product business into a diversified and robust platform selling a portfolio of solutions to address varied needs. In this context, the Company’s early strategy of consolidating adjacent technologies via tuck-in acquisitions made enormous sense. Through this approach, Everbridge established a dominant CEM offering by creating a platform that obviates the need for customers to contract with multiple point solution providers. As the markets for managing response to risks converge, we believe Everbridge is in an excellent position to continue winning market share.
In addition to a leading market position, the Company has other attributes that make the business highly attractive. Everbridge is widely considered to have the most robust technological platform in the industry. This is underpinned by the Company’s ability to deliver a differentiated offering backed by greater scalability in message volumes, two-way communication capabilities, extremely high reliability and global operations with a maintained local presence. The Company also has an attractive financial model with many enviable characteristics: multiple product offerings, high incremental gross margins, attractive unit economics and a model that should support material profitability at scale. Furthermore, the brand is synonymous with being the “gold standard” for CEM, where customer “reference-ability” creates substantial network effects that reinforce purchasing decisions among peers.
Unfortunately, despite these advantages and tailwinds, we believe the current Board and management team have failed to effectively manage the Company’s business, execute on the Company’s opportunities for growth and deliver value for shareholders. While the markets for software and information technology have enjoyed tremendous returns over the past several years, Everbridge has lagged with lackluster performance. When comparing Everbridge’s returns with its group of self-identified peers in its most recent proxy statement, Everbridge has underperformed across practically every time horizon. As one can see, this underperformance has only grown more dramatic with the passage of time.
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|
Total Returns |
||||||||||
Company |
Market Cap (In thousands) |
YTD Returns |
1-Year |
2-Year |
3-Year |
5-Year |
Since IPO
|
|||||
|
1,339.8 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|
|
|||||
AppFolio Inc Class A |
2,189.4 |
- |
- |
|
|
|
|
|||||
Fastly, Inc. Class A |
1,648.1 |
- |
- |
- |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|||||
Ping Identity Holding Corp. |
1,681.6 |
- |
- |
|
NA |
NA |
NA |
|||||
Sprout Social Inc Class A |
2,802.8 |
- |
- |
|
NA |
NA |
NA |
|||||
BlackLine, Inc. |
3,973.6 |
- |
- |
|
|
|
NA |
|||||
Five9, Inc. |
5,879.8 |
- |
- |
|
|
|
|
|||||
PROS Holdings, Inc. |
1,355.7 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|
|
|||||
SPS Commerce, Inc. |
4,362.7 |
- |
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
Coupa Software, Inc. |
5,418.1 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|
NA |
|||||
New Relic, Inc. |
3,889.1 |
- |
- |
|
- |
|
|
|||||
Q2 Holdings, Inc. |
3,081.0 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|
|
|||||
Digital Turbine, Inc. |
3,159.0 |
- |
- |
|
|
|
|
|||||
OneSpan Inc. |
499.6 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|||||
Rapid7 Inc. |
5,559.9 |
- |
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
Upland Software, Inc. |
497.8 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|
|
|||||
Dynatrace, Inc. |
11,315.5 |
- |
- |
|
NA |
NA |
NA |
|||||
PagerDuty, Inc. |
2,131.4 |
- |
- |
|
NA |
NA |
NA |
|||||
Smartsheet, Inc. Class A |
5,512.5 |
- |
- |
|
- |
NA |
NA |
|||||
Workiva Inc. Class A |
4,575.5 |
- |
- |
|
|
|
|
|||||
Average |
- |
- |
|
|
|
|
||||||
EVBG Relative Underperformance |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
||||||
Source: FactSet. |
We believe this underperformance is the result of ineffective leadership and a shocking amount of turnover among senior executives. When reviewing the list of leaders presenting at the Company’s 2018 Analyst Day, a surprising six of 13 employees are no longer with the management team only a few years later. When evaluating the named executive officers identified in the Company’s 2018 proxy statement, more than
We Believe Everbridge Is Plagued by Haphazard Execution and Deteriorating Capital Allocation
As it has continued to expand its product portfolio and market presence, we do not believe that Everbridge has been able to properly operationalize its research and development (“R&D”) resources. While Everbridge has invested in developing some products organically, the vast majority of product growth over the years has come through acquisitions. On the Company’s Q4 2021 earnings call, Everbridge called out the need to focus on integrating its acquired technologies. While this initiative makes sense, we are puzzled by why Everbridge is only now recognizing the need to integrate products after so many years, when a well-disciplined management team and Board would understand the advantages to executing on this as soon as possible.
With R&D increasing as a percentage of sales since the Company went public in 2016, during a period of predominantly inorganic product growth, we must question both the use and efficiency of the Company’s R&D program. What has all this expense been used for if not to integrate acquired technology? Regretfully, we believe the company’s R&D initiative is now tasked with the challenge of “playing catch-up” in streamlining the efficiency of a product portfolio acquired over many years. This is an extremely challenging task to take on while in the public market, and one we feel Everbridge is ill-equipped to navigate.
Although successful M&A was an early strength of the Everbridge operating model, we believe it has become increasingly expensive and less focused in recent years as Everbridge appears to have chased acquisition targets at increasing valuations. In 2021, the Company spent more on M&A in a 12-month period than in its entire history as a public company to date. Furthermore, the acquisition of Anvil was a large deal that appears to us and industry experts to be curiously off-the-mark: a primarily services-based business that doesn’t seem to fit with Everbridge’s long-standing focus on recurring revenue software. Everbridge does not disclose contributions from M&A, seemingly obscuring that the Company has been paying higher prices to acquire growth. This apparent deterioration in capital allocation discipline is extremely troubling and suggests that the current leadership team is increasingly willing to gamble with shareholders’ resources.
It is our belief that Everbridge would not feel the need to “reach” for M&A were it not for the fact that the Company’s go-to-market engine has stalled under the current leadership team. As Everbridge has evolved from selling a single product to selling a platform targeting multiple buyers across different geographies, its direct sales force has unfortunately failed to keep pace. Instead, under current Chief Revenue Officer
Notably, the Company’s latest Chief Marketing Officer,
We are deeply troubled by the Company’s response to its current circumstances. As described above, the deterioration in operational discipline that has occurred in recent years has permeated every aspect of the organization: we believe M&A has become undisciplined under the leadership of Chief Financial Officer
We Believe the Board Is Misaligned with Shareholders and Blind to Blatant Conflicts of Interest, and Endorses Extremely Problematic Executive Compensation Practices
It has been quite some time since we have come across a situation where the Board’s lack of alignment with shareholders is as concerning as it is at Everbridge. As illustrated above, shareholder returns have been abysmal across every time horizon analyzable. While shareholders have suffered tremendous harm, insiders have been insulated from the collapsing share price largely because of their minimal ownership. Instead, insiders have been consistent net sellers of shares despite generous share grants throughout the years. Reviewing data from Insider Score shows that since going public, current and former insiders of Everbridge have sold nearly 5,000,000 shares of common stock for a value totaling over
As of the Company’s most recent proxy statement, the Company’s officers and directors collectively own less than
We believe this glaring lack of accountability to shareholders is further illustrated by the questionable actions of Chairman
The Right Time to Explore Strategic Alternatives
We believe Everbridge is a valuable strategic asset addressing a mission critical need in a large market with vast upside potential. We believe Everbridge is dramatically undervalued at current share prices, representing an attractive acquisition target to both strategic and financial buyers. In our view, the issues the Company is facing are not structural, but rather self-inflicted due to incompetent leadership that has failed to execute. We believe that, operated by a capable team, Everbridge will be able to rectify its current issues and recapture a trajectory of durable growth. This is not something we believe can be achieved through the hiring of a single, or even a few, new executives. To be clear, we do not believe that simply hiring a new CEO would be enough to set Everbridge back on course. Considering the pervasive issues at the Company, turning Everbridge around in the public eye is likely a challenging endeavor that is fraught with risk. However, this is just the task that private equity firms highly skilled in operational discipline would be well-equipped to accomplish. There are a number of financial sponsors with operating assets in the CEM industry, as well as strategic buyers, that we believe would be well-suited to operate the business more effectively.
Everbridge represents an attractive asset for an acquirer to consolidate the market and continue taking share. Our analysis suggests that a financial sponsor could pay
As shown below, the comparison group of Everbridge software peers identified in the Company’s 2021 proxy statement trades at a substantial premium to the Company’s current valuation:
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|
TEV / Revs |
Rev Growth |
|||||||||
Company |
Stock Price |
Market Cap (In thousands) |
TEV |
2022 |
2023 |
2022 |
2023 |
|||||
|
|
|
|
3.8x |
3.3x |
|
|
|||||
AppFolio, Inc. |
|
|
|
8.4x |
7.0x |
|
|
|||||
Fastly, Inc. |
|
|
|
6.4x |
5.5x |
|
|
|||||
Ping Identity |
|
|
|
5.5x |
4.6x |
|
|
|||||
Sprout Social, Inc. |
|
|
|
14.8x |
11.3x |
|
|
|||||
BlackLine, Inc. |
|
|
|
9.0x |
7.5x |
|
|
|||||
Five9, Inc. |
|
|
|
9.4x |
7.6x |
|
|
|||||
PROS Holdings, Inc. |
|
|
|
5.5x |
5.0x |
|
|
|||||
SPS Commerce, Inc. |
|
|
|
9.8x |
8.5x |
|
|
|||||
Coupa Software Inc. |
|
|
|
8.4x |
6.8x |
|
|
|||||
New Relic, Inc. |
|
|
|
5.6x |
4.7x |
|
|
|||||
Q2 Holdings, Inc. |
|
|
|
6.2x |
5.2x |
|
|
|||||
Digital Turbine, Inc. |
|
|
|
3.2x |
2.4x |
|
|
|||||
OneSpan Inc. |
|
|
|
2.1x |
2.0x |
|
|
|||||
Rapid7, Inc. |
|
|
|
9.2x |
7.6x |
|
|
|||||
Upland Software, Inc. |
|
|
|
2.7x |
2.6x |
|
|
|||||
Dynatrace, Inc. |
|
|
|
13.1x |
10.5x |
|
|
|||||
PagerDuty, Inc. |
|
|
|
6.4x |
5.1x |
|
|
|||||
Smartsheet Inc. |
|
|
|
6.8x |
5.3x |
|
|
|||||
Workiva Inc. |
|
|
|
9.7x |
8.1x |
|
|
|||||
Average |
|
|
|
7.5x |
6.2x |
|
|
|||||
Median |
|
|
|
6.8x |
5.5x |
|
|
|||||
Source: Capital IQ. |
When evaluating a list of software acquisitions that have occurred in recent years, take-out valuations are again materially higher than Everbridge’s current trading multiple:
Target |
Acquirer |
Date |
TEV (In millions) |
NTM Rev (In millions) |
NTM Revenue
|
EV / NTM
|
Cerner |
Oracle Corp. |
|
|
|
|
4.7x |
Mimecast |
Permira |
|
|
|
|
9.2x |
Vonage |
Ericsson |
|
|
|
|
4.1x |
Mailchimp |
Intuit |
|
|
|
|
12.5x |
Norton Lifelock |
Avast |
|
|
|
|
11.1x |
Medallia |
|
|
|
|
|
9.4x |
|
KKR, CD&R |
|
|
|
|
5.5x |
Proofpoint |
|
|
|
|
|
9.8x |
BlueYonder |
Panasonic |
|
|
|
|
0.0x |
McAfee (Enterprise) |
Symphony Technology |
|
|
|
|
3.0x |
|
Okta, Inc. |
|
|
|
|
32.5x |
Wrike |
Citrix Systems |
|
|
|
|
12.2x |
RealPage |
|
|
|
|
|
8.2x |
Pluralsight |
Vista |
|
|
|
|
8.2x |
Slack Technologies, Inc. |
salesforce.com, inc. |
|
|
|
|
24.0x |
|
Coupa Software |
|
|
|
|
8.5x |
Seqment |
Twilio |
|
|
|
|
11.1x |
|
Intercontinental Exchange |
|
|
|
|
18.6x |
|
salesforce.com, inc. |
|
|
|
|
11.1x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.4x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.6x |
|
Vista |
|
|
|
|
5.6x |
Qualtrics International, Inc. |
SAP SE |
|
|
|
|
15.4x |
|
Vista |
|
|
|
|
7.1x |
|
IBM Corp. |
|
|
|
|
7.9x |
|
Twilio |
|
|
|
|
9.8x |
Marketo |
Adobe |
|
|
|
|
10.3x |
|
Broadcom, Inc. |
|
|
|
|
4.2x |
Adaptive Insights |
Workday |
|
|
|
|
11.0x |
|
Microsoft Corp. |
|
|
|
|
20.5x |
MuleSoft, Inc. |
salesforce.com, inc. |
|
|
|
|
14.1x |
|
SAP |
|
|
|
|
8.1x |
|
Oracle Corp. |
|
|
|
|
9.1x |
|
Microsoft Corp. |
|
|
|
|
6.1x |
Demandware |
salesforce.com, inc. |
|
|
|
|
9.3x |
Marketo |
Vista |
|
|
|
|
5.8x |
Average < |
|
|
|
|
7.3x |
|
Average 20 |
|
|
|
10.7x |
||
Average > |
|
|
|
|
15.1x |
|
Source: |
As illustrated below, when applying a sensitivity analysis to Everbridge’s valuation, there is substantial upside to the current share price:
Everbridge Scenario Analysis |
Low |
|
Middle |
|
High |
|
2022 Revenue midpoint |
429 |
|
429 |
|
429 |
|
EV/Sales |
5.0x |
|
7.5x |
|
10.0x |
|
Enterprise Value |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
+ Cash |
488 |
|
488 |
|
488 |
|
- Convertible debt |
(825) |
|
(825) |
|
(825) |
|
Market Cap |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Fully diluted shares |
41.2 |
|
41.2 |
|
41.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Price/Share |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Upside to current price |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Ancora estimates. |
In sum, it is obvious to us that Everbridge is a high-quality business that remains dramatically undervalued. Unfortunately, we have no confidence that this value will be unlocked by the current management team or Board, which we feel are principally responsible for years of mismanagement and value destruction. Furthermore, we strongly oppose the hiring of a new CEO, which we believe will only serve as another distraction that introduces even more instability. Instead, we believe the Board must urgently take action to close the valuation gap through a prospective sale of the Company, which will provide immediate value to shareholders at a premium rather than continuing to let them suffer the current status quo.
Sincerely,
Chief Executive Officer and Executive Chairman | President | |||||||||
***
About Ancora
Founded in 2003,
__________________________
1 Company peers include APPF, FSLY, PING, SPT, BL, FIVN, PRO, SPSC, COUP, NEWR, QTWO, APPS, OSPN, RPD, UPLD, DT, PD, SMAR and WK.
View source version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220317005331/en/
gmarose@longacresquare.com / ckiaie@longacresquare.com
Source:
FAQ
What is Ancora Holdings' proposal for Everbridge on March 17, 2022?
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