J. Daniel Plants and David Mowry Call for Special Stockholder Meeting to Reconstitute Cutera’s Board
Cutera, Inc. has faced significant governance issues as highlighted by Executive Chairman J. Daniel Plants and CEO David Mowry, who together own 7% of the company. They have called for a Special Meeting of Stockholders to address the removal of several board members, citing dysfunction and failure in CEO succession planning. Mowry expressed concerns over the board's inability to agree on a successor and its lack of transparency, while Plants criticized the board's political behavior. This turmoil has hindered long-term decision-making and strategy implementation, resulting in a factionalized board. They aim to enable shareholders to vote on new board representation, emphasizing the urgency for change to restore confidence and strategic direction at CUTR.
- Ownership of 7% by Executive Chairman and CEO indicates high personal investment in company's success.
- Plans for a Special Meeting provide shareholders a chance to influence board composition and governance.
- Ongoing board dysfunction is causing delays in CEO succession planning and overall decision-making.
- Lack of transparency and conflicts of interest among board members are undermining corporate governance.
Executive Chairman Plants and CEO Mowry Believe Current Board Has Become Factionalized and its Agenda is Being Driven by Directors Prioritizing Their Own Interests Over Those of Cutera Stakeholders
Highlight Failed CEO Succession Planning, Conflicts of Interest and Misapplications of Basic Corporate Governance as Evidence of Need for Immediate Board Change
Both Notices call for the removal of Directors
In light of this, Messrs. Mowry and Plants have each issued public statements in their individual capacities.
“In early January, I communicated to the Board that I wished to begin a transition process to facilitate my retirement as CEO. The Board considered a number of its own members – including
Out of serious concern regarding some of the interim ‘solutions’ the Board was openly considering as my replacement while the search was being conducted, on
Making matters worse, these critical deliberations around succession planning are being conducted during informal meetings held by a subset of the Board. It is disappointing to me that through the actions of the Entrenched Directors, the Board has reached such a level of dysfunction that critical decisions are not being made and vital initiatives are unable to move forward. As the Company’s CEO, I was particularly disturbed that the Entrenched Directors chose to repurpose a simple 8-K – that had been prepared by Company management and counsel in response to a request from our auditors – into the opening salvo of the public fight that they seem to prefer over a private resolution. They then chose to file the 8-K on
While I have tried to remain neutral and focused on the long-term value creation strategy that we have been building at
“As an investor in
When it became apparent that the state of the Board’s governance had become so corroded that it was impeding our ability to achieve performance objectives, I first sought to reach a constructive solution with my fellow Directors by pursuing a confidential internal dialogue directed toward a resolution. After scheduling a Board meeting with the express purpose of discussing a resolution of the concerns raised in my letter, the Entrenched Directors came to the meeting with no intent of having this discussion and had instead already engaged several defense advisors, despite having sought no Board authorization to do so. Moreover, on
The Notices delivered by Messrs. Mowry and Plants require that the Special Meeting be held within 60 days of the date of the Notice. The Notices further demand that the Company provide each
The letter sent by
Chairman, Board of Directors of
Members of the Board of Directors of
Dear Colleagues:
As you know, I have a long-term relationship with
I am also one of the Company’s largest and longest-tenured stockholders. Since 2013, my investment firm,
Since becoming Executive Chairman almost two years ago, I typically spend more than 20 hours per week working on
As Executive Chairman, I have taken the lead in identifying and developing Cutera’s long-term strategic vision. For the first time in the Company’s history, we now have a multi-year strategic plan with a cadence of targeted product launches; actionable plans to enter adjacent and new categories, expanding the Company’s total addressable market; and a financial model with the potential to fundamentally re-rate the Company and unleash significant stockholder value. The first phase of this plan has already been implemented through the innovative strategy for our breakthrough AviClear acne device and disruptive “placement-driven” commercial model. Every aspect of Cutera’s business, operations and financial model are being positively impacted as a result of this transformative strategy.
In my ten years as an investor and eight years on the Board, I have never been more committed to Cutera’s success. Given my long history of service to the Company; leadership role in developing its current strategy; and alignment through the substantial investment of capital, I have only one interest– to see
* * *
As convinced as I am of Cutera’s potential for future prosperity, I have concluded that the current state of Cutera’s corporate governance – and specifically the functioning of the Board – has devolved into such a deplorable condition that it will, until resolved, continue to impede the Company’s fulfillment of its goals and objectives. More specifically, the actions of certain members of the Board have led to an untenable situation requiring urgent corrective action.
Among my serious concerns:
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Failed CEO succession planning. The selection of a CEO is any Board’s most important responsibility. Yet in recent months, the Board has lurched from one plan to another in its feckless effort to identify a successor to our present CEO,
Dave Mowry . The Board’s shifting priorities and allegiances have lacked objectivity, transparency and rationality and, even worse, have yet to produce an actionable succession plan, leaving the Board factionalized and the Company exposed to needless instability and uncertainty.
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Inability to make long-term decisions. The Board’s current paralysis has rendered the pursuit of long-term opportunities, both organic and inorganic, extremely difficult. The lack of clarity as to the long-term management of
Cutera has also impeded the recruitment of senior talent throughout the organization.
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Misapplications of basic corporate governance. In its effort to generate outcomes that suit the interests of its individual members, a subset of the Board has engaged in a series of ultra vires actions and decisions, attempting to control critical Board decisions through private conclaves rather than proper meetings of the Board, excluding Directors they deem unaligned with their self-interested agendas. This ignores Board processes prescribed in the amended and restated bylaws (the “Bylaws”) of the Company and well-established principles of
Delaware corporate law.
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Conflicts of interest. The same subset of Directors has permitted members of the Board they deem sympathetic to participate in crucial deliberations in which those Directors have a material financial and personal conflict of interest.
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Misappropriation of corporate assets and machinery. Without proper authorization, certain members of the Board have commandeered Cutera’s outside counsel, drawing upon the Company’s law firm in their personal battle against other Directors, but doing so at the Company’s expense, and conflicting the Company’s lawyers in the process.
- Micromanagement and operational interference. Individual members of the Board have engaged in officious conduct in operational and personnel decisions that are squarely within the province of management. Such behavior not only distracts and dilutes the time of senior management but sends conflicting signals into the organization as to whom they are supposed to follow. Earlier this year, members of the Board repeatedly pressured management to issue financial forecasts that were rosier than market conditions warranted and would have, had management acceded, damaged the Company’s credibility and financial position.
* * *
The net effect of the foregoing is a factionalized Board, at conflict internally with itself and with management, that disserves all of our stakeholders. It is particularly critical that we rectify this now, given the series of essential decisions facing the Company and the current state of paralysis.
Accordingly, attached as Annex A to this letter is notice of a special meeting of the Board (the “Special Board Meeting”), pursuant to Article III, Section 3.7 of the Bylaws, to discuss these critical issues. Given the gravity of this matter, I expect my colleagues will make themselves available for the Special Board Meeting that I have duly noticed and called to occur on
Although I am hopeful that a candid discussion of these issues can lead to their constructive resolution, recent events temper my optimism. I am therefore simultaneously pursuing an alternative path to resolve this deadlock by allowing Cutera’s stockholders to express their views directly as to whom they believe will best represent their interests. Article II, Section 2.3 of the Bylaws empowers the Chairman to call a special meeting of the Company’s stockholders (the “Special Stockholder Meeting”). As such, and acting in my capacity as Chairman, I have exercised my authority to call such a meeting; attached to this letter as Annex B is the formal notice and demand for the Special Stockholder Meeting.
Recognizing that the 2023 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the “2023 Annual Meeting”) is planned for
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The immediate resolution of the issues outlined in this letter is imperative and is the only viable way to extricate the Board from the dysfunctional morass in which it is currently mired. If we cannot resolve them at the Special Board Meeting, then we shall proceed with the duly called Special Stockholder Meeting, allowing the stockholders of the Company to have their voices heard in electing a Board which they believe best represents them.
As always, I look forward to your response and working together to act in the best interests of Cutera’s stakeholders.
Respectfully yours,
Chairman, Board of Directors of
cc: Corporate Secretary
Attachment: Notice of Special Meeting of the Cutera Board of Directors
***
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FAQ
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